Sorawut Wongsaranon

As the border conflict with Cambodia fuelled a surge of nationalism, the military was cast as a national hero. With the 2026 election closing in, People’s Party campaigners, who have long proposed military reform, reported being questioned by market vendors and passers-by over their criticism of the armed forces, making military reform appear far-fetched.

Yet pressure to downsize the armed forces persists, driven not only by the opposition but also by some within the military itself, as shown in the first instalment on the military reform series. Structural discontent over compulsory conscription remains unresolved, reinforcing calls for a transition to a voluntary system, as shown in the second instalment.

The prolonged tensions have laid bare weaknesses in combat readiness linked to inefficient procurement and the need for reform of the budget procedure, which is the focus of the last instalment of the series. This raise the question whether blind increases in weapons procurement budgets are truly cost-effective.

In late May 2025, during parliamentary debates on the 2026 Budget Bill, Chayaphon Satondee, an MP of the People’s Party, which has also been at the forefront of exposing the security sector’s Information Operation against its own citizens, revealed that much of the Thai military’s equipment suffers from inadequate maintenance, with some weapons systems sidelined due to a lack of spare parts.

Attributing this problem to inefficient procurement practices, Chayaphon proposed fixing regulations to increase domestic procurement and help develop Thailand’s own defence industry, an approach that could benefit not only the military but also the economy. The challenge is how to ensure that when national budgets are used to purchase expensive foreign systems, Thailand gains more than just the weapons themselves.

Improve budget procedures

Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a People’s Party MP and former chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, said that over the past two years, there has been noticeable improvement in how the armed forces propose their budgets. The White Papers and explanations given to the parliamentary budget committee have become far more detailed and transparent, clarifying how funds will be used.

The armed forces have also been more willing to disclose procurement information to the committee, rather than classifying everything as a military secret. Among the three branches, the Royal Thai Air Force has shown the greatest clarity.

However, a major problem remains in the way budgets are explained during hearings of the Select Committee on the Annual Budget Bill. The armed forces still rely on a single commander from each service to provide explanations, acting in a capacity equivalent to a department director-general—despite the military’s deeply layered hierarchy.

Wiroj proposed two key changes. Firstly, department-level commanders must present and answer questions directly before the committee, since the funds involved come from taxpayers. Secondly, Section 17 of the 2020 Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on Budgeting must be amended. This regulation grants the armed forces special privileges not afforded to other agencies, allowing service commanders to consult directly with the Budget Bureau to revise their budgets and only inform the Defence Minister within 45 days afterward.

Under this regulation, service commanders can effectively change budget allocations without prior ministerial approval. This elevates the regulation to the practical level of an act of parliament and gives the military the status of a state within a state.

“The minister becomes just a nobody. After 45 days, you have purchased something already, you have issued the TOR, and you have begun the bidding already. If budgetary power is not pulled back to the executive or the legislature, we will never see a military under civilian government, never see a military that belongs to the people. That picture will never happen, because you can spend the budget however you want, change it however you want because it’s done legally,” said Wiroj.

Improving budget processes and transparency underpins not only more effective procurement, but also a shift in civil–military relations towards civilian oversight, downsizing efforts, reform of military service, the development of domestic weapons production, and reduced reliance on foreign technologies—allowing resources to be focused where they matter most.

Towards domestic production

“[When it comes to] the weapons procurement budget, the way I and the People’s Party think about it, we sat down and calculated and found that we may have to ask the public to agree to increasing the military budget—and it is very likely to that it will happen, because funding for development of the military is really limited at the moment.” said Wiroj.

This increase is despite the potential budget gain from proposed downsizing efforts which include reduction of personnel. Any increase in defence spending, he said should come with a greater proportion of domestic procurement, so that additional funding helps build Thailand’s own defence industry. This industry is already designated as a strategic target under the national strategy, one of the few elements of that strategy he said he actually agrees with.

Beyond that, Thailand’s defence industry has the potential to create a full supply chain, generating high-skilled jobs within the country. This would not only produce economic benefits but also enhance national security, as Thailand would no longer need permission from foreign technology owners to upgrade its weapons systems.

Reliance on foreign procurement has created persistent problems for the Thai military — ranging from maintenance and upgrades to spare parts stockpiling — while offering little benefit to the Thai economy, as it does not contribute to industrial development or workforce skills. As a result, any foreign weapons purchases should be tied to industrial and technological offset policies. If such mechanisms are put in place, he said, the public could be persuaded to accept increased defence spending aimed at enhancing the military’s capabilities.

For example, Wiroj said that Thai Aviation Industries (TAI) has already obtained licences to maintain large aircraft and military helicopters—demonstrating Thailand’s existing strengths in engineering and technical expertise.

The former Chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs also argued that the Thai military must develop its own military drone capabilities, relatively low-cost weapons capable of missions ranging from reconnaissance to destroying high-value assets such as tanks or naval vessels.

Civilian drone systems, he said, cannot simply be repurposed for military use because of security risks, including software vulnerabilities that could expose the location of drone operators to adversaries, as well as the danger of flight data being transmitted abroad. If rival countries purchase systems from the same manufacturer, he asked, how can Thailand be confident that its data would not be compromised? Thailand therefore needs to develop its own military drone systems—and, if possible, turn them into export products.

Wiroj pointed to Sweden’s model as an example. Sweden separates responsibilities between two agencies: the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, which consolidates military requirements and tasks domestic industry with developing weapons systems for the government; and the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, which oversees the export of strategic military goods, ensuring that Swedish weapons are used strictly for defence, not aggression, and that recipient countries are democratic, non-hostile, and unlikely to become adversaries of Sweden.

However, the Thai military has yet to complete its policy for drone operations, including deployment and counter-drone measures. Military drones range from large unmanned aerial vehicles like the US Predator to small, infantry-level portable drones. Without a coherent policy, procurement, operations, and inter-service coordination risk becoming disorganised and ineffective.

While there are private Thai companies with the capacity to manufacture export-quality defence products, they face military regulations that act as barriers. One such rule requires that any weapon system procured by the Thai military must already have been deployed by the manufacturer’s home country. This effectively disqualifies Thai firms from consideration.

“I believe we may need to also increase the budget for the military, but in exchange for domestic procurement with clear, step-by-step principles. And all TORs must be reviewed to ensure fairness, and there must be no criteria that excludes domestic defence manufacturers,” Wiroj said.

The military appears to have acknowledged this issue. Defence Minister Gen Natthaphon Narkphanit said the regulation would be reviewed and amended. That said, domestic procurement alone cannot fully meet the military’s needs. Certain weapons systems, such as fighter aircraft, remain beyond Thailand’s current technological and manufacturing capabilities.