Sorawut Wongsaranon

Military reform was a central issue in Thailand’s 2023 general election, with the People’s Party emerging as the most prominent advocate of change. As the 2026 election approaches, however, a border conflict has erupted, fuelling an unprecedented surge of nationalism and restoring the military to a position of heightened public reverence — raising fresh doubts over whether reform remains politically possible.

Yet calls for change have not disappeared. In an interview with Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a People’s Party MP and former chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, a set of concrete proposals emerges. Despite his uncompromising stance on civilian oversight, Wiroj demonstrates a detailed understanding of perspectives within the armed forces — and, crucially, some within the military appear to share his view.

This first instalment of three-part series on the military reform examines one foundational question: can the Thai military realistically be downsized?

Too little, too late.

One way to look at the size of the Thai military is through budget allocations and troop numbers.

Looking at the budget, more than 50% of annual defence spending is consistently allocated to salaries and welfare for personnel across all branches, including both career officers and conscripts. And in terms of manpower, data from 2023 show that the Thai armed forces had nearly 400,000 personnel, including conscripts.

Defence budget and personnel expenditure (2022–2026)

Source: Annual Budget Acts, fiscal years 2022–2026

Military personnel by branch (February 2023)

Source: Status of Ministry of Defence Personnel, February 2023, cited in the unofficial study “Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military” by Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, written as part of the Senior Executive Development Programme, Civil Service Training Institute,, Office of the Civil Service Commission, 2023.

Can a force of this size be considered efficient? More progressive voices among both civilians and the military say no. While plans to downsize already exist within the armed forces, their implementation is expected to be modest at best and to take far longer than many members of the public have been calling for.

Old soldiers never die

“Generals today were cadets at the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School in the past. They are the result of miscalculations in manpower planning. Back then, we feared the Cold War would escalate, so large numbers were recruited,” Wiroj said.

”Now they are nearing 60. They haven’t done anything wrong. I think this is something the state must deal with and not asses that there are more than needed and simply cut them loose.”

Wiroj maintains that downsizing remains necessary. Firstly, the military’s early retirement scheme must offer stronger incentives.

According to the Office of Military Service Commission, an early retirement scheme was implemented under Cabinet resolutions between 2008 and 2018. Eligible personnel received a lump-sum payment based on the remaining years of service, capped at 8–15 times the final monthly salary, including position allowances. Under the current scheme, it has been reduced to 7–10 times.

“The reduced incentives led to fewer generals or colonels joining the scheme and it is limited to generals only. Your scheme should also be open to colonels. And there is no publicity from the military.” said Wiroj.

Secondly, the military’s highly fragmented departments and units need to be consolidated. However, Wiroj likened the process to merging two schools, each with its own principal. “If neither has done anything wrong, and both are hard-working and committed, what do you do?” he said.

Wiroj argued that successful reform must be carried out gradually to minimise resistance. Who implements the reforms also matters.

“For the political side to dissolve agencies at random wouldn’t be right. Having the owner of an agency propose abolishing it is unrealistic,” Wiroj said. “So there needs to be a central internal body of the military, like a consultancy, to come in and study when personnel numbers are reduced to a level where they can be realistically joined to a certain agency.”

Thirdly, military personnel numbers could be reduced. According to the Royal Thai Army, the approved strength currently stands at 133,357 personnel. However, cutting the roughly 88,000 conscripts is not feasible. Instead, he argues that a more realistic scope for cuts lies in other sections, which together account for around 45,000 personnel.

These include around 4,000 personnel in command units, 8,000 in administrative and logistics roles, 21,000 in regional units, 8,000 in training and military doctrine, and another 4,000 in national development units. Together, these could be reduced by roughly half — to around 20,000 positions—bringing total army personnel down to roughly 110,000.

If certain functions are necessary, “they can be procured as service contractors, as other government departments do,” Wiroj said. He suggested that routine maintenance tasks such as mowing lawns, gardening, and cleaning toilets be outsourced instead of assigning them to conscripts — a practice so entrenched that it continues to be reproduced in Thai soap operas.

Insiders agree

“More than half of the Ministry of Defence’s current budgetary burden is spent on personnel. This affects the budget available for mission operations and project implementations, including procurement of military hardware and spare parts acquisition, and maintenance,” wrote Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, Assistant Director-General, Office of Military Service Commission, Ministry of Defence, in ‘Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military’, a report prepared in 2023 as part of the Senior Executive Development Programme, Civil Service Training Institute, Office of the Civil Service Commission.

The report closely mirrors proposals put forward by Wiroj, outlining reform targets the military had set for itself. The obstacles it identifies reflect deep-seated institutional inertia.

Early retirement schemes that were implemented by the Cabinet, the Military Service Commission and the National Defence Council approved the majority of retirement applications. However, it has been argued that these schemes resulted in the loss of too many capable personnel, forcing the Ministry to recruit and appoint new staff to replace those who had left.

Early retirement participation by approval authority

Source: “Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military,” Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, 2023.

The military also sought to reduce the number of generals in advisory positions and commissioned officers in operational roles. Specifically, advisory positions were to be cut from 768 to 384, and commissioned officers from 2,696 to 1,349—half of their 2008 levels. However, positions eliminated in some areas were effectively reabsorbed into newly established units. Even if not at the same scale, this prevented the intended reductions from being fully achieved.

A plan to reduce active-duty military personnel by 5% by 2027 failed during 2021–2022 due to lack of an integrated, ministry-wide recruitment system. Efforts to replace military personnel with civilian officials did not clearly reduce overall personnel numbers or the Ministry of Defence’s budget. And attempts to reduce conscription intake proved difficult, as it was viewed as having a direct impact on the military’s missions.

Maj Gen Sathaporn proposes restructuring units based on threat assessments, including comparative analyses of military capabilities within ASEAN, developing integrated manpower plans; outsourcing, more targeted cuts — such as reducing special advisory general positions to 288 by 2028 with minimal disruption, developing multi-skilled personnel, and implementing an early retirement scheme limited to low-performing personnel.

But again, the report cautions that the proposals will face “a lack of acceptance from relevant agencies.” Units slated for downsizing are likely to resist change, while legal constraints, potential impacts on personnel morale, and the financial burden of early retirement schemes and investments in replacement technologies pose additional challenges.

Reform of the Defence Council

For downsizing to work, the Defence Council, a key decision-making body in military governance, must allow measures to be implemented. At present, it does not.

Among its many problems, only two of the Defence Council’s 25 members are civilians—the defence minister and deputy defence minister, who serve as Chair and Deputy Chair. The remaining members comprise 19 military officers and three “qualified experts” nominated by the Defence Council itself.

This composition stems from the 2008 Ministry of Defence Organisation Act, a legacy of the 2006 military coup. An attempt to amend the Act was ultimately shelved after the draft bill was withdrawn from the parliamentary agenda.

Proposals have come from three sources. Regarding the Defence Council’s composition, the Pheu Thai Party proposes a 15-member Council comprising nine military officers, one director-general-level civil servant, and three external experts. The People’s Party suggests a smaller 12-member Council with the weakest military presence—five military officers alongside five external experts. By contrast, the Judge Advocate General’s Office proposes a 21-member Council that would retain the strongest military influence, with 14 military officers and five external experts.

The greater the military presence, the weaker the civilian oversight, increasing the need for political manoeuvring for the Council to function. However, all proposals share common elements: reducing the number of Council members, adjusting the proportion of external experts, and transferring the power to nominate those experts to the Cabinet—with final approval by the Defence Minister—rather than allowing the Defence Council to appoint them internally.

“They [the military] say they don’t want politics to interfere, but a structure that is completely made up of soldiers alone like this slows the armed forces down,” Wiroj said, noting that even senior officers on the Council have privately acknowledged that many proposals are stuck in a queue.

“This is something that needs to be discussed and resolved. I say it’s possible to talk about it, because progressive-minded officers, they already know that the current Defence Council structure is extremely slow. It’s not that they’re unaware of the problem.”