Sorawut Wongsaranon

Even as a border conflict with Cambodia has fuelled an unprecedented surge of nationalism, restoring the military’s public reverence ahead of the 2026 election, Thailand continues to face mounting long-term pressure to modernise its armed forces.

As reported in the first instalment of this series, efforts to downsize the military are already under way, with even some senior officers acknowledging the need for reform despite persistent internal resistance. Calls to reform the military recruitment system have likewise not disappeared, as the structural causes driving discontent remain unresolved.

Conscription in Thailand is widely perceived as deeply unattractive. Rather than being trained in any meaningful way, many conscripts are treated as servants for higher ups, while others have suffered serious abuse in barracks, sometimes leading to fatalities that have resulted in minimal punishment for perpetrators.

Seeing little purpose in remaining, some conscripts leave the ATM cards they are issued to receive subsistence allowances with instructors in exchange for permission to return home, a corrupt practice widely acknowledged in public discourse.

This lack of attractiveness is also reflected in the composition of recruits. On 8 May 2025, Col Eakalak Intarakosit, Director of the Policy and Planning Division, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army, told the House Committee on Military Affairs that conscription draws disproportionately from socially disadvantaged groups rather than individuals with higher education or professional skills.

The pool of conscripts, Col Eakalak added, also includes individuals facing social problems. Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a People’s Party MP and former Chair of the Committee, cited data suggesting that roughly 20% of conscripts entering the military through the draft have a history of drug use. In other words, the military itself has a growing incentive to attract more qualified recruits.

This second instalment continues the conversation with Wiroj by focusing on a central reform challenge: how to address corruption within the conscription system, encourage conscripts to remain in service after their discharge date, and expand voluntary enlistment as a pathway toward reducing reliance on compulsory service.

Answering these questions would also help pave the way toward transforming military service into a fully voluntary system. It will not only allow individuals greater freedom of choice and stronger protection of their rights, but also enable the armed forces to recruit more competitive personnel, develop more effective capabilities, and spend taxpayers’ money more efficiently.

Non-pay incentives

One of the talking points of military reform advocates is the need to professionalise the armed forces by raising salaries to competitive levels. But implementation is far from straightforward given limited resources.

“One of the quagmires we’re stuck in is that due to low military pay, some people say just raise salaries. But if you go down that road, you’ll hit a dead end,” Wiroj said.

Increasing pay for privates would inevitably require corresponding raises for non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers—and possibly even mid-ranking officers—ultimately making the budget unsustainable.

Instead of raising pay across the board, the House Committee on Military Affairs identified a cost-effective solution through surveys of conscripts: what they valued most was the ability to return home, or to have family members visit.

Despite similarly low pay, positions in local administration organizations, or even physically demanding jobs such as hospital porters, are far more sought after because they allow workers to return home after work.

The committee proposed a model in which conscripts would remain in barracks for six months. The first three months would be dedicated to training, followed by an adjustment period working within units. After that, if there are no field operations or training exercises, they should be allowed to commute daily.

At the Armed Forces Headquarters, a pilot scheme allowing conscripts to return home was introduced. Although only four or five soldiers took up the option because their homes were nearby, overall satisfaction improved when they were given the choice.

This would not only reduce bribery to secure permission to return home and lower the risk of human rights abuses, but also boost conscripts’ morale and improve the military’s public image. It would also build on the existing online recruitment system, which already allows applicants to choose their preferred unit but does not yet permit them to commute from home.

Increase volunteers

While salaries for troops cannot be raised universally, Wiroj suggests offering higher pay to soldiers who choose to extend their service beyond their original discharge date. This, he argued, would create more targeted incentives without significantly increasing the overall budget.

At present, such soldiers are counted as new applicants in the following year. Because they already have operational experience, commanders often favour retaining them, and these soldiers receive additional benefits, including bonus points in examinations for non-commissioned officer (NCO) positions.

This approach is also linked to efforts to expand voluntary recruitment. The number of people volunteering for military service has steadily increased in recent years. Although not all applicants are eligible or ultimately enlisted, volunteers now account for more than 50% of total manpower demand.

Voluntary military applicants by year

Total manpower requirement and total number of military applicants, including both online applications, applications submitted at recruitment centres, and conscripts who choose to extend their service beyond the original discharge date. 

Source: Ministry of Defence, “Sanam Chai 2” Facebook page.

Online applicants by year

Source: Ministry of Defence Spokesperson’s Office (data for 2021–2024 and 2026). 2025 data covers online applicants to the Royal Thai Army only.

To accommodate more applicants, the military needs to integrate data systems across units. Currently, some units receive more applicants than their quotas allow, but information on surplus applicants is not shared with neighbouring units that still have vacancies. As a result, willing applicants are effectively excluded from service.

“Just build a system like TCAS [Thai University Central Admission System]. Let them choose their first and second choices,” Wiroj said. “You can also create a system inside the Paotang app—but it turns out there is no system.”

Address rights violations in barracks

Whether enlistment is voluntary or compulsory, the House Committee on Military Affairs believes that human rights violations in military barracks require robust solutions. These include permitting external oversight by bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand.

It should also permit relevant international mechanisms under treaties to which Thailand is a party including surprise inspections under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT).

Wiroj cited the Royal Thai Navy’s conscript training system as an example of best practice. The Naval Recruit Training Centre, Naval Education Department, brings all conscripts together for centralised training. Instructors and commanding officers adopt a professional, educator-oriented mindset, focused on developing sailors rather than punishing them.

He also acknowledged some progress following the enactment of the Anti-Enforced Disappearance and Anti-Torture Act. “In principle, the military must not regard its own people as enemies. Even under martial law, the detention of civilians must be carried out in accordance with the law. If the law is violated, you should be brought before a civilian court,” he said.

However, without deeper reform, Wiroj warned that serious problems would persist. Cases involving military personnel, both corruption cases and criminal cases involving harm to civilians, are still tried in military courts.

During deliberations of the Military Court Organisation Bill that Wiroj witnessed, the armed forces argued that when soldiers commit offenses such as torture or unlawful detention even under martial law, punishments imposed by military courts are harsher than those of civilian courts.

However, military courts fall under the Office of the Permanent Secretary for Defence. Embedded in the chain of command, they are susceptible to patronage, making their impartiality questionable, Wiroj argued.

Military courts should serve to check unlawful orders from commanders or handle disciplinary matters during combat operations such as insubordination during active duty. But corruption-related offenses, including money laundering, bribery, or unexplained wealth unrelated to command decisions, should fall under the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct.

“Once traces of corruption are seen, you can’t run to the military court system like before. And you can’t use patronage systems and cliques to pull strings for you. I don’t believe you can pull strings with the Criminal Court for Corruption and Misconduct because it’s judicial power. And you don’t think that I will persecute you because I can’t order the court either. I can only submit all the evidence to prosecutors and the court is a trial system where it can summon evidence on its own.”

This would not only improve the military’s public image, encourage voluntary enlistment, and reduce corruption linked to draft evasion, but more importantly, it would recalibrate civil–military relations by deterring unlawful violence against civilians and future coups. If soldiers knew they would face civilian courts, they would think twice before acting.