The border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia appears to be escalating, even though there have been no further clashes since those on 28 May, which resulted in no deaths or injuries on the Thai side but left one Cambodian soldier dead.

Cambodia has expressed its intention to take the four latest disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These involve Ta Muen Thom Temple, Ta Muen Tot Temple, Ta Kwai Temple, and the Emerald Triangle.

Thailand has stated that it will not accept the court's jurisdiction and insists on resolving the matter through the Joint Boundary Committee (JBC), the first day of which started today (14 June). Cambodia previously said, however, that it will not be discussing the disputed aread at the JBC meeting.

Amid growing uncertainty, the Pheu Thai government faces public outcry, fuelled by surging nationalism, talk of legal efforts to replace the Prime Minister, and even calls for a junta, while civil society continues to campaign for peace.

Meanwhile, the Royal Thai Army arbitrarily announced its readiness to use force, despite Thai Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai having met with his Cambodian counterpart to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful resolution. 

Representatives of the Thai and Cambodian military also met on 8 June for a negotiation, after which both sides agreed to retreat to the positions they held in 2024 and hold weekly meetings to ease tensions. Cambodian troops will also fill in the trenches they dug.

Supalak Ganjanakhundee, a former news editor, a researcher and an advisor to the House of Representatives' Committee on the Armed Forces, said the Thai military has taken on many responsibilities that should fall under the civilian government. To restore civilian control, the government must adopt more effective diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution.

Weak government

Supalak described the situation as 'abnormal' from the beginning due to a lack of clear guidelines on how civilian-military relations should be conducted.

If, during patrols, the military discovers trench digging that violates the MOU43, it has a duty to follow the chain of command. It must report the incident to the commander, the Ministry of Defence, and the Cabinet according to established procedures, so that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can formally protest to Cambodia for violating the agreement.

The clash at Chong Bok lasted only 10 minutes. With no further clashes, the remaining work should be left to the government to negotiate with its counterparts. In fact, meetings of the General Border Committee were held just recently, and in the Regional Border Committee, the Army Area Commanders were permitted to engage in discussions.

However, this time the government was slow to respond.

“Phumtham took a week before he went to Chong Bok.” said Supalak “In fact, he should have gone since the first day to first confirm the facts about who exactly was responsible. If it was because they shot first, then we protest. When the government didn’t take action, the army stepped in.”

Instead of reporting the trench digging to the government, the military went to the media. The fire at the Trimuk Pavilion, initially described as a wildfire, was later claimed to have been started by Cambodia despite a lack of thorough investigation.

Military overreach

Not all actions by the military are considered overreach. Marches and military exercises, for example, are standard demonstrations of military capability.

Likewise, the armed forces’ meeting on 6 June regarding the border dispute was a routine response, provided they followed proper protocol: informing the minister, who then informs the cabinet, and subsequently the cabinet informs parliament.

However, numerous other cases reveal a breakdown in the chain of command, where the military usurps authority over the civilian government.

According to reports, the Second Army Area Commander announced his decision not to withdraw from the line based on the military’s own map (1:50,000), which is neither part of the MOU nor recognized by Cambodia. Such a decision should fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thanks to the military’s public relations efforts, the Second Army Area Commander was portrayed as a national hero, elevated above even government leaders. Amid this display of charisma, it remains unclear whether the government can now order him to comply.

“If you say you won’t retreat from this line of ours, we treat it our way like this. So if one day the government says that we must withdraw tactically, will you do it? What the Commander said here is an issue. The question is if the government orders a withdrawal of troops, will the commander follow it?” asked Supalak.

Military overreach can be seen in other actions. The military publicly opposed bringing the matter to the ICJ, a stance that, notably, Cambodia’s military did not take, recognizing that such issues should be handled by legal experts.

It is the government spokesperson who should address matters of this nature. Yet, it was the Army’s spokesperson, Winthai Suvaree, who spoke out.

Instead of focusing solely on Cambodia, the Thai military also focussed its psychological operations inward, urging citizens to show patriotism through hashtags. Again, it is an effort that should have been led by the civilian authorities.

“Now the military is competing with the government to win political popularity points among the people to affirm that the people support the military and that the civilian government is incompetent. Eventually, it leads to some people going as far as simply calling for a coup already.”

While another coup remains unlikely, the more immediate impact is expected to be felt in the upcoming 2023 budget bill. In the current political climate, no MP is likely to risk cutting the military’s budget.

“This is a gambit by the Thai elite, made long ago,” said Supalak. “They will always be able to use the quarrels with Cambodia as one of the first actions to highlight the military’s role. Even though in an actual fight they may not be able to fight the Cambodians, they have never really fought. They just flex their muscles at each other.”

Diplomatic weakness

Cambodia was well aware of its military disadvantage, so it shifted to other means. Hun Sen proposed bringing the matter to the ICJ as early as 30 May, a move later echoed by his son, Hun Manet.

Due to the lack of civilian leadership, Thailand remains stuck in a peculiar military approach, with the army projecting strength to the domestic audience, declaring its readiness to fight, while simultaneously taking over civilian responsibilities.

As a result, Thailand struggles to adapt to its opponent’s strategy and appears psychologically vulnerable.

“The military must always be ready for battle. That’s true. But the military’s combat readiness isn’t about showing off. A military that shows off its combat readiness is a military that is not ready psychologically. If you’re ready, you don’t show off.”

Thailand’s loud rejection of the ICJ also reveals a sense of insecurity. It could have simply declined the court’s jurisdiction, something Cambodia knew would stall the process. In addition to holding firm on its stance, Thailand, especially its civilian government, must broaden its diplomatic repertoire.

“The diplomatic tools are not limited just to the JBC; there are many others,” said Supalak. “The issue here is that Thailand is trying to close off all multilateral channels, leaving only the bilateral ones, because we believe that if it stays bilateral, we can bully Cambodia.”

“It is a common misunderstanding that the JBC will solve the problem. It’s not a magic pill. Rather, it is a forum where both sides come to exchange opinions and work together on border issues because they have been working together for 25 years.”

“They have surveyed and established boundary markers, completing about 60% of the markers that exist. Usually, when incidents occur, like the case of Preah Vihear, the JBC meeting is just a chance to meet face to face, and each side points its finger at the other. But this forum still exists.”

Thailand continues to rely on the same approach. While Cambodia may benefit from the bilateral framework and MOU43, which includes all French-prepared documents and maps, it also holds other options for leverage.

During the previous Preah Vihear dispute, aware that it couldn’t match Thailand’s military strength, Cambodia welcomed third-party involvement. The ICJ issued provisional measures requiring both sides to withdraw their forces, and ASEAN, with Indonesia taking the lead, stepped in to monitor compliance and prevent further encroachment.

“Cambodia was actually very fair in daring to let a third party in to observe. It was the Thai military that wasn’t fair,” said Supalak. “You keep blaming the Cambodians for being dishonest. You said you’ve withdrawn your troops. You are honest with your words, but you don’t even dare to let someone else verify it.”

Careless sanctions

Defence Minister Phumtham initially ruled out closing the border, citing potential economic fallout. However, as pressure mounted, the military was granted authority under martial law to proceed.

Again, the matter was leaked to the public before reaching the cabinet. Supalak said that, again, such a strategic decision should rest with the civilian government, and the measure must be exercised with caution.

Prior to the military being granted authority, Thailand’s ambiguous signals about a potential border closure, driven by domestic political turmoil, had already triggered nationwide disruption and local anxiety.

Some of the border checkpoints under discussion carry little significance. For example, Chong An Ma in Nam Yuen District, Ubon Ratchathani Province, is a minor trading point that was previously open two days a week, now reduced to just one.

“I can’t imagine what the military impact will be,” said Supalak. “At most, the people won’t be able to find mushrooms, buy forest products from the other side, or come to buy soap and toothpaste. And how will this give Thailand ‘the upper hand’ against Cambodia?

“With regard to closing border, I think we are clearly shooting ourselves in the foot because we benefit enormously in terms of the economy, amounting to hundreds of billions of baht,” Supalak said.

“Our economic system is far more complex than Cambodia’s. It’s not that we do this and the other side will suffer,” Supalak said, explaining that now Cambodia enjoys more economic choices, namely Vietnamese and Chinese products.

The opposition’s call to cut electricity and internet ignores the fact that power sold to Koh Kong also supplies other areas, not just call centres or casinos. Thailand cannot selectively cut power in areas where only Cambodia has control.

Cambodia has also been cooperating in cracking down on scams that have impacted hundreds of thousands in Thailand, so using electricity as leverage risks undermining that cooperation.

Many may wish their governments could do more. In response to that concern, Supalak noted that if the conflict remains in the diplomatic domain, it could take decades to unfold, but the upside is that it would avoid bloodshed.

No matter what decision is made, politicians must call out military overreach because, in the end, they will be held responsible for the actions of the military regardless of whether they have control over them.

“The government must quickly say that this cannot be. The opposition must also quickly speak out. All the politicians in parliament must quickly say that the military has done its job well, rightfully and correctly in protecting the country. But they do not have the right to interfere in the management of political policies and international relations.

“The first shot fired, no matter who fired first, will escalate the situation. When the situation is out of control, on that day, the army will not be responsible. The government are the ones who must be held responsible. Paetongtarn is fully responsible. Phumtham is fully responsible.”