Sri Lankan Advisory Mission Winds up Visit
‘Valuable lessons shared’

Prachatai, Thursday April 1, 2010

The last session of the Sri Lankan Advisory Mission on dealing with the problems of Thailand’s deep south was intended as a wrap-up session to deal with any outstanding questions arising from the previous days’ specialized strategy workshops on Military Actions against Dissident Civilian Populations, Approaches to Negotiation, Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons, Squeezing Terrorist Funding, and Control and Suppression of Independent Media.

Representatives of the Sri Lankan military and government were on hand to respond to queries by their Thai counterparts who had attended the programme as part of the government’s consideration of adopting the ‘tough crackdowns’ that had been used successfully against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam movement.

Any change in Thai government strategy, a government spokesman insisted, would maintain the integral place of justice and human rights in its policy towards the decades-old conflict. Differences between the two situations also meant that it was unreasonable to expect that lessons learned from Sri Lanka could be applied without modification.

Questions from the audience seemed to indicate a divergence of views between the members of the security services and representatives from the civilian side. Where one side seemed very ready to accept the idea that living in Thailand while Muslim was itself reason for suspicion, with consequences in terms of surveillance, detention and restriction of freedoms, other participants pointed to the difficulties of reconciling this position with Thailand’s human rights obligations.

All participants agreed that there were significant differences in the international context of the two conflicts. Whereas the Sri Lankan government were able to undertake severe repression measures with little fear of protest by foreign nations, the same was not true of Thailand.

Were Thailand to replicate events in northern Sri Lanka, protests from the Muslim world, not least its neighbours in ASEAN, would be more than likely. Shelling makeshift refugee camps, restricting access to medical care and similar actions, no matter how essential these might be for security reasons, would be difficult to justify to the international community.

The Working Group on Control and Suppression of Independent Media, however, felt that effective control of news reporting could remove these difficulties. This would not be limited to measures restricting the freedom of the media, but would include positive government propaganda. An ISOC representative pointed to the wide experience that his organization had gained in placing positive stories in the media (in Thai and English), in decorating Skytrain trains, etc. With sufficient budget, he was confident that an effective campaign could be mounted.

The Working Group pointed out that while the electronic media could be effectively managed, and the local press intimidated, the world of cyberspace was a concern. Internet penetration is more advanced in Thailand than in Sri Lanka and consequently much more difficult to control. The so-called Cybercrime Law could, the Working Group felt, be further strengthened and penalties increased.

The Working Group on Military Actions against Dissident Civilian Populations appeared to have been particularly successful, resulting not only in a Plan of Action, but also in a detailed budget for additional weapons, equipment, and other resources to implement the Plan.

The Working Group on Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons was especially impressed with the Sri Lankan experience. The advantages of interning the vast bulk of a suspect population were obvious, but the Group felt that much could be learned from Sri Lankan techniques such as offering early release for that part of the detained population under 5 years of age. In numerical terms this could be presented as a genuine attempt to release detainees early; but since these infants’ parents and relatives remained in detention, they always asked for the children to stay in the camps. This could be presented to the international media as evidence that the detainee population actually preferred internment.

An important question that none of the earlier sessions had successfully answered concerned what to do if and when things went wrong. Even with strict media control, blanket use of the Internal Security Act, the Emergency Decree and Martial Law, and careful planning and implementation, it was undeniable that reports of unfortunate incidents might still leak out.

The Sri Lankan advisors admitted that this was a difficult situation. What was needed, they said, was someone who could be presented to the international community. This spokesperson should appear sincere, knowledgeable (even if unaware of the true facts), and preferably good-looking. Most importantly this person should be able to speak flawless English. ‘As if he had been educated in Eton,’ as one of the Sri Lankan delegation put it.

A representative from the Prime Minister’s Office said this was no problem.

About author: Bangkokians with long memories may remember his irreverent column in The Nation in the 1980's. During his period of enforced silence since then, he was variously reported as participating in a 999-day meditation retreat in a hill-top monastery in Mae Hong Son (he gave up after 998 days), as the Special Rapporteur for Satire of the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and as understudy for the male lead in the long-running ‘Pussies -not the Musical' at the Neasden International Palladium (formerly Park Lane Empire).