Karen state, Myanmar

For nearly eight decades, the Karen armed struggle has pursued a single political goal: federalism inside a unified Myanmar.

Now, a small faction of Karen leaders says that the goal has failed.

On 5 January, Major General Nerdah Mya—a longtime prominent figure in the Karen National Union (KNU)—announced the creation of a new state, the Republic of Kawthoolei, declaring independence from Myanmar and proposing a new political path for the Karen movement.

The announcement marks a dramatic break from the strategy that has defined Karen resistance since 1949.

Although the idea of independence has only recently entered public debate, the figures behind the newly declared Government of Kawthoolei (GOK) are not newcomers to the Karen–Burmese conflict.

Major General Nerdah Mya, who now calls himself president, has long been one of the most influential figures in the Karen armed struggle. The son of the late General Bo Mya, who was a long-standing leader of the Karen National Union (KNU). Nerda Mya was a senior leader of the KNU and had held this position for decades; he once commanded its armed wing.

The KNU expelled him in July 2022, accusing him of ordering the killing of 25 unarmed men. Nerdah Mya said that his men did nothing wrong, claiming that the men were Myanmar army spies. Research by Fortify Rights later said the action constitutes a war crime. After the split, he renamed the forces under his command the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA).

With only a few hundred fighters, the KTLA has remained a small and quiet presence along the Thai–Myanmar border—so small, some observers say, that many had begun to forget it existed.

That changed on 5 January.

Major General Nerdah Bo Mya and the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA) on 5 January 2026. (Photo: Facebook/Kaw Thoo Lei Army)

“The Federation has failed.”

For generations, ethnic political movements in Myanmar argued that federalism could reconcile minority autonomy with a unified state dominated by the Burman majority.

But leaders of the newly declared Government of Kawthoolei say that vision has repeatedly failed.

Hsargay Po, a veteran Karen political figure who spent three decades working inside the KNU, now serves as vice president and foreign minister of the Government of Kawthoolei. Speaking during a recent interview while traveling in Europe, he said that what he called a “radical reset” is required.

After years of negotiations that produced little real autonomy, he said many Karen leaders concluded that federalism never seriously intended to redistribute power.

“It was never really federal,” he said. “It was always a model where Burma remained the mother state.”

Political dialogue over the past decade reinforced that view. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), signed in 2015 between Myanmar’s government and several ethnic armed groups, including the KNU, was initially seen as a path toward political negotiations. Critics later argued it constrained resistance forces while leaving the core power structure intact.

“The idea was that everyone would live together in one union,” Hsargay Po said. “But the structure always kept power in the center.”

For the Government of Kawthoolei, the conclusion is clear: independence may offer a more realistic path.

Ideological divide

The emergence of the Government of Kawthoolei marks a sharp break from the KNU, which for decades has been the main political and military representative of the Karen people.

It also reflects a generational shift.

Around 80,000 to 90,000 Karen people now live in the United States and Canada, forming a politically active diaspora that has become an important source of financial and political support.

According to leaders of the Government of Kawthoolei, younger Karen activists abroad increasingly view independence—not constitutional reform—as the only viable long-term goal.

“They don’t believe federalism will work,” Hsargay Po said.

He insists, however, that the new government has not closed the door to other Karen organizations.

“We believe we need to talk,” he said. “And we will constantly and tirelessly explain to all of our nationmates.”

That includes the KNU itself, where he said he had spent years trying to persuade leaders before the split—and will continue to do so.

Among the senior figures who joined the Government of Kawthoolei is David Tharckabaw, a long-time KNU vice president and former foreign minister.

When the equation grows too complex

Leaders of the new government often explain their political strategy using a metaphor from mathematics.

Myanmar’s conflicts, they argue, have become so complex—shaped by multiple armed groups, competing agendas, and decades of mistrust—that solving them within a single political system may no longer be possible.

“When equations become very complicated, the first thing you do is simplify them,” Hsargay Po said. “Independence is the best solution we have for this equation.”

Supporters point to international precedents where independence followed prolonged conflict, including Timor-Leste in 2002, the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993, and the creation of South Sudan in 2011.

“A divorce first,” Hsargay Po said. “Then after that, we can cooperate.”

The Government of Kawthoolei is also seeking alliances with other ethnic political movements that favor sovereignty.

In 2025, it signed a memorandum of understanding with the Kachin National Organization (KNO), a political group advocating independence for the Kachin people. While the more powerful Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) has long supported a federal solution, the KNO remains committed to sovereignty.

“An independent nation is our birthright,” said Hkanhpa Tu Sadan, foreign secretary and spokesperson for the KNO. “It is not about secession. It is about our own rights.”

A map by ISP Myanmar from July 2025 showing territory controlled by the KNU and other groups, including the KTLA

A new state with no land?

The Government of Kawthoolei acknowledges that its territorial control remains limited.

According to its leaders, the group holds small pockets of territory in the south of the Karen State and maintains smaller positions in places such as Brigade 6 near the Thai border.

But Hsargay Po argues that fragmented territorial control has become typical across Myanmar’s war zones.

“No one controls the entire state,” he said.

Karen areas remain divided among multiple armed actors, including the KNU, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), and the Karen National Army (KNA), which is aligned with Myanmar’s military.

Lieutenant Colonel Naing Maung Zhaw, spokesperson for the KNA—which recently left its role as a Border Guard Force (BGF)—said the Government of Kawthoolei had never discussed its independence plan with his group.

Looking toward Thailand

Another pillar of the group’s strategy is closer engagement with Thailand, which shares a long border with Karen territories.

Karen armed groups have maintained working relations with Thai authorities for decades, particularly during the Cold War when both sides opposed communist insurgencies.

Today, the government of Kawthoolei leaders sees Thailand as a natural economic and political partner. They envision a future in which Karen, Mon, Shan, and Karenni territories could emerge as independent states along Thailand’s western frontier.

“We can move beyond the Burman political sphere,” Hsargay Po said, “and be more closely linked with Thailand, which is our natural neighbor.”

A senior member of the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), the provisional government administering Karenni State, offered a different perspective.

“There’s no plan for us to announce independence,” the official said. “We will follow federalism. If it fails, we would just return to our origin.” Karenni was once an independent state, even during British rule.

Asked whether he would seek official recognition from Thailand, Hsargay Po acknowledged that such a scenario remains distant.

“If Thailand recognized us today, it would not necessarily change our struggle,” he said. “For us, being friends as we have been for decades is kind enough.”

Fault lines in the resistance

The shift toward independence also reflects tensions within Myanmar’s broader anti-junta opposition.

Hsargay Po pointed to the case of Bo Nagar, a militia leader from Sagaing Region whose group once operated alongside resistance forces linked to the National Unity Government (NUG).

Disputes over leadership and resources eventually created friction, he said, and Bo Nagar later broke with the resistance and reportedly reached an arrangement with Myanmar’s military.

“When a revolution lasts too long, people begin to split,” he said.

KTLA soldiers participating in a commando training in December 2022 (Photo: Myanmar Now)

Skepticism—and support

Many analysts remain skeptical that a new Karen state could emerge.

A member of the KNU’s committee in Myawaddy told BBC Burmese that the group behind the new government represented only a small faction.

“It’s people from a single village,” he said. “They barely conduct any significant activities and are not currently involved in the fighting.”

Some commentators have mocked the proliferation of rival political authorities in Myanmar.

“The country already has too many presidents,” one media outlet joked, referring to the leaders of the military regime, the ousted civilian government, the National Unity Government, and now the Government of Kawthoolei.

“Visiting one small armed group site, I was introduced to many ministers,” one academic said with a faint smile. “Now they will have more ministers to introduce.”

Yet supporters argue that political transformations often begin as ideas that initially seem unrealistic.

A survey conducted by the US-based advocacy group Power Mentor among 9,686 Karen participants inside Myanmar and across diaspora communities reported that 98 percent supported independence for Kawthoolei, while 2 percent favored remaining within a federal Myanmar.

Independent verification of the survey results is difficult. But leaders of the Government of Kawthoolei say the findings reflect growing frustration after decades of stalled negotiations over federal reform.

For them, the debate is no longer theoretical.

Eight decades on the crossroads.

Myanmar today is fractured into overlapping zones of control, governed by ethnic armed organizations, resistance forces, and the military junta. In many areas, the authority of the central state exists largely on paper.

In that landscape, the declaration of the Government of Kawthoolei represents more than the ambitions of a small armed faction. It reflects a broader question now emerging across Myanmar’s ethnic frontier: whether the country’s long-promised federal union can still be rebuilt—or whether the war is pushing parts of the country toward a different political future altogether.

The government of Kawthoolei believes the coming years could prove decisive; 2026 and 2027 could bring major political shifts if additional ethnic organizations begin pursuing sovereignty.

Whether those ambitions can translate into political reality remains uncertain.

But the emergence of the Government of Kawthoolei highlights a growing shift in Myanmar’s ethnic politics after decades spent trying to reshape the union.

Some leaders are beginning to question whether the union itself can hold together.