Story by Raviwan Rakthinkamnerd, Donlawat Sunsuk, and Spol Tanpraphan

20 – the age of the youngest Thai soldiers killed in recent clashes with the Cambodian military.

During 2 waves of fighting, spanning July and December 2025, a total of 42 soldiers died. The deadliest days were 25 and 27 July, with seven fatalities each day. The dead were all non-commissioned officers, the highest rank among them being staff sergeant. [1]

Their families were paid twelve million baht in compensation, an amount 3 times lower than it should have been if assessed using the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), a framework widely employed in economics and recognised internationally as a standard for estimating appropriate death compensation.  Under its terms, families should have received 33 – 39 million baht, a figure reflecting not just salary earnings but also the societal value of a worker’s life. [2]

Commissioned officers enter military service through academies, beginning their careers at higher ranks that place them on a structured pathway toward senior command positions. For those who serve until retirement, lifetime benefits including salaries and pension are as high as 41 – 50 million baht - an amount 3 to 4 times higher than the compensation paid for the deaths as low-ranking conscripts.

If sovereignty is “priceless", why is the compensation assigned to those who die in its defence so low?  One reason is a mindset that treats rank and file troops as a “cheap resource” that can be readily mobilised through a long-standing conscription system. This is reflected in the number of Thai men drafted each year to face lethal risk; the average is between 90,000 and 100,000 individuals, with annual fluctuations but no downward trend. At a time when technology is increasingly replacing manpower on the battlefield, the question remains: why does Thai military doctrine continue to deploy low-ranking soldiers into close-quarters combat?

Unequal risk shouldered by rank and file troops

Death hierarchy refers to ranking deaths by the significance attached to different categories of people.  Shaped by social valuation and power relations, it is an analytical framework for studying mortality rates in armed conflicts. Examining military deaths within the Israeli armed forces in 2020, for example, Israeli sociologist Yagil Levy found that wartime casualties are indicative of power structures in the military. Low-ranking soldiers are valued less than high-ranking officers who possess stronger educational backgrounds and closer ties to the armed forces. The closer a soldier is to the centre of power, the greater the perceived value placed on preserving their life and the less likely they are to die on the battlefield, a fate disproportionately shared by rank and file troops.

Suphalak Kanchanakhundee, an independent scholar and advisor to a parliamentary military committee, explains that this way of thinking is embedded in military institutions worldwide, including Thailand. Thailand’s modern military doctrine and force structure are almost entirely derived from the United States. Even the existence of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School follows traditions modelled after West Point, dating back to an era when the United States still relied on conscription to fight its wars. Although the U.S. abolished the draft after the Vietnam War, officially ending conscription in 1973 and transitioning to a professional military while maintaining reserve forces, Thailand has continued to adhere strictly to the older system.

The rigidity of rank hierarchy in the Thai military is reflected in its manpower pyramid scheme. Conscripted troops and non-commissioned officers occupy the lowest tier, as defined by the insignia on their shoulders. With no need to command others, they are sent to the frontlines.  Their role is simply to follow orders and carry weapons into battle, even though many have no real combat experience. This is why battlefield casualties are usually privates, men who have only had a few months training, many at an age when they should be attending university. If they die, replacements are readily obtained through conscription.

From an economic perspective, deploying low-ranking soldiers to the battlefield is the “cheapest” type of warfare, financially and politically. As Suphalak notes, conscripts are not civil servants. Their salaries are fixed for the duration of their military service at around 15,000 baht per month, and they are not entitled to long-term welfare benefits. Moreover, if one dies in combat, the existing chain of command remains unaffected whereas the death of a commanding officer could undermine operations.

As Suphalak explains, the military’s emphasis on cost-efficiency is further demonstrated by its use of human as opposed to technological resources to absorb enemy fire and risk minefields.

A clear example is its deployment of ranger units, instead of surveillance drones, to patrol border areas.  Although rangers risk stepping on landmines, human lives are cheaper than military equipment worth tens of millions of baht.

“The lower the rank, the cheaper the price the military has to pay. If a conscript dies, no one needs to answer any questions. But if a colonel or a general dies, the cost is far higher. That is why it is not surprising that low-ranking soldiers are sent to die on the front lines.”

At present, all three branches of the Thai armed forces possess various types of drones, with a heavy emphasis on combat crafts. For surveillance, the military has used DP-20 drones for reconnaissance, including flights over Cambodian territory.  Good for long-distance remote operations, the model is nonetheless large and needs a runway for takeoff.  After one was shot down in Poipet on 18 December 2025, the military switched to modified commercial drones with shorter operational ranges.

If drones were regularly deployed to preserve human life, losses on the ground would be lower, however. Surveillance drones could replace foot patrols for route reconnaissance and enemy detection. They could also be paired with LiDAR drones for detailed terrain mapping, enabling accurate representation of the area without sending in troops.

Trapped in rank hierarchy: military technology for prestige

The manpower ratio of troops deployed against opposing forces in the latest round of border clashes is one to one (1:1). This is based on an assumption that one combat soldier is capable of neutralising at least one enemy combatant, a way of thinking that dates back to World War I, when soldiers only had machine guns and hand grenades[1] . Despite the fact that modern warfare technologies have advanced to the point where, in some battlefields, human presence is no longer required at the front line, the Thai military continues to deploy near-full manpower in all its operations.

According to Dr. Chatchada Kumlungpat, an expert in military innovation policy an a visiting scholar at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Japan, Thailand has been utilising mechanised warfare technologies, obtained largely through direct and indirect transfer from the U.S. military, since the Cold War, and the country now makes effective use of technology to replace human soldiers in long-range surveillance and strike coordination.  This latter activity uses a C41I system, which is controlled by humans but with AI assisted in targeting and attacks, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/drones). Military technology development is also ongoing, being formally overseen by the Defence Technology Institute (DTI).

Chatchada notes, however, that the Thai military was built on a manpower-centric model, as evidenced by its continued reliance on conscription. This guarantees a large pool of enlisted soldiers readily available for combat, making command-and-control structures the primary mechanism for managing forces. In contrast, professional militaries in many other countries are constrained by limited manpower and as a result, they rely on advanced technology to preserve soldiers’ lives. Professional soldiers are therefore required to possess high levels of technological expertise, often in specialised engineering fields.

Although the Thai military has attempted to enhance its technological capacity to match international standards, the transition toward fully technology-driven warfare has remained partial and inconsistent. The primary obstacle is a rigid bureaucratic system that prioritises rank hierarchy over professional competence. It can thus be said that the Thai military has adopted military technology largely to enhance firepower and prestige rather than to fundamentally transform operational practices. This is reflected in the accumulation of outdated equipment left unused due to a lack of personnel capable of operating it effectively. Consequently, infantry units continue to be deployed in combat in place of technological alternatives.

As Chatchada explains, “many military innovations fail not because the technology itself is unready, but because institutions are unable to adapt their decision-making structures, command systems, and internal culture to accommodate new forms of warfare

If the military insists on going into battle, it must stop insisting on sending people to die.

“Jobs, money, and manpower” form the three pillars that sustain Thailand’s bureaucratic system. The military is itself a bureaucratic institution. Control over personnel translates into budgetary figures circulating within the organisation, as well as the number of subordinates who can be ordered to turn left or right at command. For Dr. Chatchada, organisational transformation within the armed forces represents the most formidable challenge – far more difficult than any incoming technology. Technology, by its very nature, replaces human beings. Yet the Thai military has resisted this substitution, because the loss of manpower would mean that the three bureaucratic pillars that uphold institutional power would be affected.

Chatchada argues that reshaping military culture will ultimately require intervention from the political sector, not an easy task.

Suphalak thinks that the Thai military’s manpower-centric doctrine and reliance upon conscripted soldiers, will reach a dead end on its own. A larger military consumes enormous personnel and budgetary resources, with daily operational costs running into billions of baht, steadily draining national finances.

Moreover, Thailand’s population is in demographic decline, with fewer births each year. This means fewer young men will be available for conscription. Moreover, as these conscripts are not professional soldiers, their cost-effectiveness in warfare cannot compare to the economic value of returning them to the labour market.

Regardless, the latest confrontation between the Thai and Cambodian militaries has prompted many parties to critically re-examine the role, priorities, and strategic thinking of Thailand’s armed forces. In a world where warfare technology has advanced far enough to protect the lives of rank and file soldiers, the Thai military continues to send them to die on the front lines, raising questions of how human lives should be positioned on the battlefield and whether the lives of the fallen were worth what was gained in return.

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[1] According to the Ministry of Defence’s latest disclosure in 2023, Thailand’s armed forces consist of approximately 400,000 personnel distributed across military units nationwide. These personnel are not deployed to combat operations, and if they serve until retirement age, the state remains responsible for supporting them for the rest of their lives.

[2] The Value of Statistical Life (VSL) figures referenced are based on economic models published in international academic journals (Witvorapong & Komonpaisarn, 2020), adjusted to 2024 price levels. Comparative international studies estimate Thailand’s VSL at approximately 32.5 million baht (Viscusi & Masterman, 2017).