The unprecedented rejection by the Privy Council of a decree to dissolve parliament has intensified the unresolved legal debate over an Acting Prime Minister’s authority. Legal academic Worachet Pakeerut stressed that the authority also rests with an Acting PM, warning that the Privy Council’s intervention could also risk deepening constitutional ambiguity.

The contentious debate regarding an Acting PM’s authority to dissolve parliament had engaged several Thai legal scholars. The complexity escalated when the Privy Council, the personal advisory body to the Thai King, rejected a draft royal decree submitted by former Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai that sought the dissolution of parliament.

Worachet Pakeerut, a lecturer at Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law, believes that an Acting PM can dissolve parliament. He emphasised that whether the PM is merely suspended or removed from office, the Acting PM undeniably holds this power.

Some argued that only the “real” PM could exercise such authority, as they are the one endorsed by a parliamentary majority. However, Worachet countered that this interpretation does not apply in Thailand, noting that, unlike Germany, where a Prime Minister must face a no-confidence vote before calling for dissolution, or the UK’s Westminster model, Thailand’s legal system is structured differently.

He asserted that in Thailand, the authority to dissolve parliament lies with the office of PM, not the individual. Importantly, the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit an Acting PM from exercising this power.

Worachet further explained that Thailand’s written Constitution borrows many concepts from the UK’s flexible unwritten constitution, which inevitably creates ambiguity in practices Thailand has never encountered.

He remarked that this debate illustrates the need for constitutional provisions to be drafted clearly and precisely, leaving no room for future political deadlocks or uncertainty.

What does the Privy Council’s rejection of the royal decree mean?

Amid heated debate, Phumtham made the bold move of submitting to the King a royal decree seeking parliament dissolution.

The draft royal decree was later returned by the Office of the Privy Council, citing procedural concerns and the unresolved legal controversy over an Acting PM’s authority. Significantly, it also referenced an opinion from the Council of State, the government’s legal advisory body, which had warned that the decree could “irritate” the King. 

Worachet commented that the latter reasoning was relatively problematic, arguing that the intellectual argument should not be limited by invoking the royal prerogative to exert pressure. “If we use the law as usual, this kind of wording will not happen; each party will act according to its constitutional authority and duty,”

He described Phumtham’s move as chivalrous amid such controversy and intimidation. He remarked that this move contributed hugely to Thai legal discourse, particularly constitutional law.

Typically, the royal prerogative applies to the power to veto a bill that has already been approved by Parliament. Under the Thai constitutional convention, if the King vetoes a bill, it is immediately abandoned.

However, no equivalent conventions or provisions govern decrees, particularly the dissolution of parliament, which under the current Constitution requires the King’s signature.

Some may argue that a similar practice could apply to a decree, but this case was unprecedented since the decree was returned before reaching the King, who holds full power to call for the dissolution of parliament.

The Privy Council’s rejection of such a decree has no precedent in Thai history. In Worachet’s view, this intervention has introduced further constitutional ambiguity by inserting a body between the Prime Minister and the King.

Even though the issue regarding the Privy Council’s intervention has yet to come to a constitutional conclusion, he said, “In the long run, it is unlikely to end well for the legal development of the Thai Constitution.”