In early April 2025, US academic Dr Paul Chambers, an expert on civil-military relations in Thailand, was charged with royal defamation under Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code and violation of the Computer Crimes Act, a pair of controversial laws that have repeatedly been used against pro-democracy activists and critics of the monarchy.

The charges resulted from a blurb on the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute website advertising an October 2024 webinar in which Chambers was a guest speaker, reportedly because the blurb mentioned the monarchy.

Chambers reported to the Police after he was informed by Naresuan University, where he taught at the time, that an arrest warrant had been issued for him, though no warrant was ever served on him. He was detained for 2 nights before being released on bail only to find that his visa had been revoked. Naresuan University also terminated his contract. The public prosecutor later dropped charges against him due to lack of evidence.

Last week, on 4 September, his lawyers filed an administrative lawsuit on his behalf against the police and the Immigration Commission over the revocation of his visa, seeking damages for abuse of power.

Dr Paul Chambers at the Muang Phitsanulok Police Station in April 2025 (File photo)

Chambers left the country after charges against him were dropped. In the months that followed, Thailand plunged into a turbulent political situation. The border dispute with Cambodia escalated into an armed conflict, while the military took advantage of the rising nationalism to expand its influence and overreach into civilian affairs. A leaked phone call between then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen eventually led to her removal by the Constitutional Court. And last Friday (5 September), the House of Representatives appointed Bhumjaithai Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul as the new Prime Minister.

One Wednesday night, as political parties were scrambling to form a government and before the House voted on a prime minister, we spoke with Chambers, now an ISEAS Visiting Fellow, about his life after he left Thailand and the royal defamation charge against him, and the future of civil-military relations under the new government.

How have you been since you left Thailand?

I'm fine. Since I left Thailand, I have arrived back in the United States where I live with my mother in Oklahoma. I'm far away though from my wife, Dr Napisa Waitoolkiat. She is the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Naresuan University. It’s difficult, because I cannot go to Thailand now, and it’s difficult for her to leave there, so there are problems, but I still stay in touch with everything in Thailand. I'm still working at the ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, where I write about the politics of Thailand, continuing issues, and I do write about the civil military relations in Thailand still.

Your lawyers filed a lawsuit on your behalf against the Police and the Immigration Commission because your visa was revoked. Do you hope that you will be able to return to Thailand if your lawsuit is successful?

Yes I do. I love Thailand and I love Thai people, and before March 2025, I never expected this to happen to me. I was just a common teacher at Naresuan University in the provincial city of Phitsanulok. I was called into the office at Naresuan University and told ‘My god, you have been charged with 112,’ and since then my life has been a roller coaster. But I'm trying to see what's going to happen now.

I need to also say that the Army, including the spokesperson of the Army General Winthai Suvaree, had stated when I was still in Thailand that the Army was going to continue to try to find anything that I might have written before and launch another 112 accusation against me. This intimidation frightens me and frightens my family, my wife, my friends, so it makes me fear returning to Thailand even if we somehow win this case, but I am always going to be with Thailand. I'm always writing about Thailand and I will return to Thailand. It's just a matter of time.

If I think I'm going to be prosecuted when I arrive in Thailand, then I won't be going to Thailand anytime soon. The situation that happened to me really hurt my mother, who is 86 years old and lives alone here. It would kill her for this to happen again and I think anybody can understand that. My wife understands that too.

For me to go back to Thailand, I have to be assured that the Army is not going to be prosecuting me again, that the Police are not going to be prosecuting me again. Of course, I’d wait for this [administrative lawsuit] to be over with. I've lived in Thailand for about 30 years. I have worked on Thai politics and I understand the chances of me winning this case are slim, especially now since the crisis between Thailand and Cambodia.

Since that crisis, the military has gained more influence in Thai politics. It's not a good time for me to want to return and perhaps have to go back to that prison, which was terrible place. I feel sorry for the prisoners who I met when I was there.

One thing I learned in my experience at the prison is that I would like to help prisoners. Prisoners have problems also in my country, in the United States, but I saw with my own eyes some terrible situations that I wish I could help or just raise awareness of problems of prisoners in Thailand, especially political prisoners, which I was one.

What did Naresuan University tell you when they fired you even though your charges were later dropped?

I think it was because the Army pressured the university to fire me, and it's kind of ironic but on 1 May, the regional prosecutor dropped the charges against me. The next day I found out I was fired.

I talked to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) and they had me deliver a document to the university’s President and Vice President saying that we will bring charges against them for wrongfully dismissing me because whenever somebody is dismissed at Naresuan University, it’s supposed to go to a committee where, as a teacher, I would have the right to say ‘why was I dismissed?’ That’s how it’s supposed to be, but they didn’t ever bring it to a committee. They simply fired me. I remember the Vice President told me ‘we are doing what’s best for the University.’

One thing for sure that the University can say though is that Immigration took away Chambers’ visa, so we have to fire him, and I think that's the excuse they’re using.

Why were you charged with 112?

I was officially charged with 112 because there was an advertisement at ISEAS that an online advertisement which stated that Paul Chambers will be speaking about military reshuffles. I never wrote that advertisement. The webinar advertisement stated that the military reshuffles exist and that in Thailand the King has more power than the Prime Minister with regards to the military. I never wrote that.

They charged me with two things: 112 and violation of the Computer Crimes Act. The 112 charge is that I posted something. That’s the exact wording in Thai. I cannot post it. I’m not the webmaster. Secondly, it was a flyer, so how could I do it? I am just a guest at a webinar.

Secondly, the charge of Computer Crimes Act was that I had this website where the bad things were. It’s not my website, so these were flimsy charges. The problem that I had was not really related to these flimsy charges, honestly. These people could have made these charges anytime, why did they choose now? I think that's a bigger question. And why were they really angry at me?

I think that I was charged with these crimes in October, because on 1 October 2024, the new Army Commander-in-Chief General Pana [Klaewblaudtuk] came into his office, and brought with him some new, very conservative, very right-wing military who began to increasingly go after people.

All of a sudden, this seminar got a lot of attention. I write about military reshuffles in Thailand every year for the last six or seven years. I've never had a problem until now, so you have to think where did this all start?

There was this webinar, and then all of a sudden in Thaipost, there was an article. A few days later, a Colonel from the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) sent a letter to my University President and they had all these questions for me. Basically, it was intimidation, and the questions were so weird, like how much money does he make, how many seminars have he been to.

We provided them answers to those questions, but then apparently they sent another letter. We know for a fact that [ISOC] sent another letter to my University President that was never shared with us, and so we were unable to provide answers to whatever questions they sent.

Later on, the Third Army Region Commander, Lt Gen Kittipong Jamsuwan and his deputy whose name is Maj Gen Chaidaen [Kritsanasuwan] formally charged me with royal defamation, and it was interesting because usually with 112, you get a summons. There was no summons. There was just arrest.

Why did this happen at all? I think because I write about the military in Thailand and I have been trying to write about security sector reform to improve the Thai military to make it more accountable to the people, to make it more accountable to the people because I think the military needs transparency and accountability in order to help Thai democracy, to help Thai people.

In the past, I also wrote about the economic empire of senior military, so I have a feeling that some senior military were irritated and that was eventually reflected in the charges against me. I think these senior military abused Section 112, charging me with something I would never do because they wanted to punish me for criticizing the military.

And why now? It’s because this faction came in to power in the Army in October and they wanted to scare me with imprisonment. They probably wanted me deported, and that’s what they got, but what they didn’t get is I’m still going to be writing about the military. Now that I’m not in Thailand, I don’t have to be afraid to write. I can write whatever I want about the military, so I don't think it helps them.

Do you think that the military has become more right-wing? Are they trying to dominate the civilian government?

Yes, and I'm very afraid that, with my case for sure, we see an example of the military trying to legitimize its intrusion into civilian affairs. We see a more aggressive military trying to play a larger role in Thai politics, and that is scary for the future of Thai democracy.

I think that the royal defamation law needs to be reformed. The military is already very opaque, and they use words like “national security” and “protecting the traditional institution,” but when you go after anybody that you don't like and then charge them with going against the “traditional institution,” that’s abuse of power.

To this day, I don’t know exactly where the charges against me started. I don’t have that name, but it’s just my suspicions because I know that this thing did not start with the Deputy Commander of Region 3 in the Army. That’s just the person who gave the formal charges. No way that it would be him alone. It would have to be approved at least by his commander, General Kittipong, and General Kittipong is nobody, so that means it would be higher than that.

At the same time, I doubt that it’s the Chief of the Defence Forces, General Songwit Noonpakdee. He’s a moderate. Because I do a lot of research on the military, I understand that this conservative faction under General Pana came in. Am I accusing General Pana? No, but somebody up there certainly did this.

That conservative faction is a faction that is dominated by Class 26 of the Pre-Cadet Academy in Nakhon Nayok. Class 26 is a very conservative faction led by General Pana but also includes Lt Gen Boonsin [Padklang], who is the Second Army Region Commander.

This faction of General Pana is also part of the Wong Thewan faction. It’s a traditional faction and it’s a unit faction. We call it sometimes the King's Guard faction. Pana is also part of the Kho Daeng (Red Rim) faction, so this is a very conservative faction, but they have interests to protect the military as an institution. This military faction went after me and accused me of a very flimsy charge to send a message, not just to me but to other foreigners and Thai people, that “don’t mess with the military.”

Usually you can be okay in Thailand if you write about anything, but you obviously cannot write about the traditional institution, which I never do, but now the military is going to try to use these laws, like 112, just to go after those who criticize the military, and it’s not going to be just me. They’re going to go after most likely Thai people.

This is a dangerous turn because it means that the military becomes increasingly intrusive in civilian affairs, and I think Thai people and people around the world need to be aware of this dangerous turn.

Speaking of Lt Gen Boonsin, he has been going around giving talks to students. What is your opinion? Is the Army trying to get the next generation on their side?

I think it’s the ISOC project. If you talk to Puangthong [Pawakapan], I think she would tell you that too.

Boonsin is retiring on 30 September. He is looking for a career. He’s not finished at all, right? He’s just starting, but he can’t continue in the military, so what can he do? He has two options: he can either be a politician like Prawit [Wongsuwan] or maybe he’s hoping to get into the Privy Council.

By going around talking to the students, he’s actually doing the work of the ISOC, but it’s also helping to spruce up his later career, whether that be in the Privy Council or as a retired military politician in a political party. But one thing's clear: Boonsin is close to Pana. They are both from Class 26, and if Boonsin goes into the Privy Council, Boonsin becomes a closer connection for Pana to the Privy Council. If Boonsin goes into a political party, then he becomes a man inside the House of Representatives. He could go into the Senate.

Can you imagine? He’s a bureaucrat. He’s a military officer, but he’s going around politicking while he’s a soldier. That shows me a lack of civilian control, because he can do that and no one can stop him. Actually, since he is the Second Army Region Commander, he is the regional head of the ISOC, but he's going to Bangkok to make these talks, which is outside of his region, so this is an indication of a lack of civilian control.

With the rise of Bhumjaithai as the leader of the government coalition, do you think we are seeing a more conservative government and a more powerful military?

Yes. I also want to say that, ever since the audio clip of Paetongtarn and Hun Sen, and the border crisis between Cambodia and Thailand, the military has found a new legitimacy to intrude across civilian affairs in terms of border policy, foreign policy, defence policy, so the Pheu Thai Party lost control of that.

Now, when Anutin becomes Prime Minister, which I think he will, then the military will be free to do what it wants. The military in Thailand is a very interesting military in that the strongest person in that military is the Army Commander-in-Chief, not the Chief of the Defence Forces. In many countries, it is in the Chief of the Defence Forces, but not in Thailand, so we know that General Pana is going to be able to do whatever he wants.

Another person, of course, who will be powerful could be whoever is the Defence Minister, because I hear there is a rumour that it might be Prawit, who is very conservative. Another one is Natthaphon Narkphanit, who is the current Acting Defense Minister, but he is close to Prayut and he is part of the military. He is not a true civilian.

Because of this crisis, and also because of the rise of Anutin, the military is going to be more autonomous. Especially as the civilian government becomes so chaotic, the military is going to become increasingly dominant. Why would the military ever need a coup now? They don’t need a coup. This is better. You have the camouflage of civilian rule when actually, the military is doing what it wants, kind of similar to during the Abhisit [Vejjajiva] government. I think Anutin will be Abhisit Part 2. He’ll just let the military do what it wants.

Is there no chance for the military to come back under the control of the civilian government?

There is a chance. In Thailand’s history, the military has been temporarily weakened sometimes. I think you can find that in 1973 and in 1992. So the Black May [of 1992] tarnished the image of the military, because on television, you see the military firing into crowds of people. That tarnished the image of the military, which helped civilians to craft a people's constitution, and that weakened the military for a while.

There was actually one other time, with Pridi Panomyong. After World War 2, Pridi was able to put together a government. It looks like there was going to be civilianization, so I think maybe you can find three important times in Thai history: 1946, 1973, and 1992.

The problem is that those three periods have not been sustainable, so we need to find sustainable civilian control. How do we do that? Does this mean that every time in Thailand, you have to have a massacre of civilians in order to control the military? It shouldn’t be that way.

What I would like to argue is that it should be in the military's own interest to support civilian control, because if the military is not under civilian control, then eventually there's going to be some crisis. It hurts the military, and it might mean the weakening of the military, although they can come back. I think maybe there needs to be a stronger voice in civil society supporting civilian control.

Of course, what the military does is it hides behind getting legitimacy to support the traditional institution, so it says “you need us, because you need the traditional institution and we are the only ones who can protect the traditional institution”. As long as the military is able to continue that claim, then it’s going to be difficult to control the military.

Would you say that the problem is we have never had a civilian government strong enough to stand up to the military?

There have been a couple times. Thaksin [Shinawatra] was strong. Thaksin was able to use the police and his own faction in the military to keep the military under some control for a time. He was able to stay in power as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006. However, eventually the military faction, Thahan Suea Rachini [The 21^st Infantry Regiment or the Queen’s Guard], was able to stage a coup. It was the same faction in 2006 and 2014. The 2006 coup was Sonthi Boonyaratglin, but it was the Queen’s Guard that carried that out. Eventually, Thaksin was toppled by the military using the same excuse that they are the protector of the monarchy.

There is another way that, in Thailand, you could have a civilian control that could have been lasting. I will give you two examples. General Kris Srivara, in 1973, was the strongman of the military in Thailand. He wanted to retire and become a politician, and become Prime Minister, as my book, Praetorian Kingdom, points out, if Kris had lived, because he died mysteriously in 1976. I think it was mango sticky rice, right? That’s what they say.

If Kris had lived, he was going to try to be Prime Minister, and since he controlled the military still, even in retirement, that would have been a way to evolve towards civilian control. A moderate in the military can do it.

The second example is General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. He was the Army Commander, retired early, and entered politics. He became Prime Minister. Unfortunately, there was the economic crisis. Every time, in Thailand, has been unfortunate, because you have these moderate military who try to become politicians, and that would change the equilibrium between civilian and military. It would make military more under civilian control, because you have moderate military wanting that, but in the case of Kris, he died suddenly and strangely, and in the case of Chavalit, he had the economic crisis. In the case of Thaksin, some people say maybe he went too far and people could think that maybe he was upsetting the traditional institution.

In another case of Pridi Panomyong, he was simply a civilian leader, but the military wasn’t going to last under him. The military was going to overthrow him and it did.

What can you do now? The moderate that I see now would be Songwit, the Chief of the Defence Forces, but he is not dominant. You do have the People’s Party, which is a good development, and you have Wiroj, who is the head of the Committee on Military Affairs. I think that if the People’s Party win the next election, that could antagonize the military. There could then be a military coup.

The only thing bad about a military coup is that, if there is a coup, then the people turn against the military, because every time there has been military governance in Thailand, people get angry. It doesn’t help the military to have a military government.

In 2019, people hated Prayut Chan-o-cha. He still became Prime Minister, but they hated him. I think, if there was a coup in Thailand against a People’s Party government, it would not be good for the military. At the same time, if the consensus in Thailand supports civilian control, then I think the military is going to go back to the barracks. I think the military is going to stop trying to dominate the situation.

But one other thing that I think we need to mention is that this Cambodia crisis really increased nationalism. I understand that, but then the military took advantage of this nationalism. That should not happen. There should be control.

So the control needs to start in all parts of the military, and if we go back in time a bit, look at late 1997 – 1998. Prime Minister Chuan [Leekpai] and General Surayud [Chulanont], who was the Army Commander-in-Chief, actually tried to bring in more civilian control over the military. The problem with Thaksin was that he supported civilian control, but not civilian control of people in the military that supported him. It was a sort of a politicized civilian control.

There needs to be a return to what Chuan and Surayudh were doing. Downsize the budget of the military. Downsize the weaponry of the military. Cut the number of troops. Prosecute rogue soldiers. Get rid of some of the land of the military because the military is the largest landowner in Thailand. All of these things needed to happen, but how was Chuan able to do that? Because the Black May helped to increase civilian power, and it was rumoured that Chuan had some support from somebody in the traditional institution, so he was able to get this done, but then Thaksin built upon this to create a sort of a civilianized politicized military.

I think, if the military is unable to use the legitimacy of the traditional institution to increase its power, then that will be good for Thailand. I think that’s important, and besides the traditional institution, Thailand needs to try to make sure that the military does not use border conflicts to increase its power. It’s difficult, but I think it’s as I said before, it’s a good thing that you have the People’s Party. The People’s Party’s involvement in the Anutin government could be helpful for civilian control because Anutin needs their support, and so maybe that's the only good thing going right now for civil military relations in Thailand.

In that case, can Anutin be pressured into keeping his promises?

That’s what they’re wondering. You have to wonder why the People’s Party make a deal with Anutin. If Anutin breaks his promise, and then the People’s Party leaves the coalition, Anutin would have to make a deal with Thaksin to stay in office. Can he do that? Thaksin might then try to take over.

I think some of the reasoning behind the People’s Party is that Anutin needs the People’s Party so much that if the People’s Party left, the government is going to fall, because if Thaksin tries to take over, Anutin would dissolve the House, and then you get early elections anyway.

Maybe that was some of the reasoning, because I know that the People’s Party don’t trust Anutin for sure, but he is the weaker of two evils. If you say, there’s two decisions: either we go with Thaksin, or we go with Anutin, but Anutin is weak, so he needs us.

But I think it’s always possible, of course, that Anutin will betray the People’s Party, and then Anutin might say you can come in the government, but I am the Prime Minister. Otherwise, I will dissolve the House.

I know that [Anutin] has those high connections, and that’s one reason that he is going to be the next Prime Minister, but I don’t think that the People’s Party is influenced by those high connections. I think they’re the only party that isn’t, so it makes me wonder why they supported Anutin. To me, it comes down to probably [that Bhumjaithai is] the weaker party. 69 MPs, I mean, it’s better to do it with them, because you can influence Anutin better.

Since Anutin can become Prime Minister with those high connections, he can probably stay Prime Minister until the next election in 2027, so that’s going to be good for Anutin. If Anutin is going to be Prime Minister, then who will be the Interior Minister? That’s a good question. Obviously not anyone from the People’s Party. We heard that maybe Thamanat [Prompow], but I’m not convinced. The point is that whoever can be the Interior Minister can select governors who can influence the next election. Whoever has control over setting up, preparing for the next election can win that election.

If Anutin is Prime Minister, Pheu Thai no longer controls the apparatus of the Interior Ministry. That’s big for the upcoming election, and putting money into the election. That means that when the next election happens, Bhumjaithai will probably do a lot better, so that it's important for Anutin to be Prime Minister now. He can put all these people in the governor position, and hopefully stay in office. Of course, he might make the People’s Party angry, but stay in office, and when the next election happens, maybe he could win the election or at least be No. 2 and help to be part of a coalition, maybe again with the People’s Party.

One thing I would add is that, because the People’s Party joined Anutin, the traditional institution is sort of co-opting and incorporating the People’s Party into the system. Maybe in the next election, Anutin will be the Prime Minister with the support of the People’s Party.

Is the system then trying to make the People’s Party less progressive?

That's what I think. Maybe the traditional institution is hoping that that's what's going to happen, that maybe it becomes weaker and weaker, so maybe the more conservative members of the People’s Party will support Anutin and those who don't like it will leave, and so you have divide and conquer. That could be the future.

Why did they not go with Pheu Thai?

I think because size matters. Since Bhumjaithai is smaller, the People’s Party might have more leverage.