As political groups across the spectrum propose their own draft amnesty bills, the royal defamation law, or Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, remains the most contentious issue in the political amnesty debate.

The military government led by Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha stepped down in 2023, but violations of the right to freedom of expression in Thailand persist.

The number of political prisoners continues to increase under the current civilian government. Civil society has been pushing for an amnesty, but progress over the past year has been disappointing.

Toward the end of 2023, the People’s Amnesty Network called for the authorities to halt still pending legal actions against political protests and online and offline political expression . In November, the network launched a petition to propose the People's Amnesty Bill, gathering 35,905 signatures. The bill was submitted to parliament on Valentine’s Day 2024.

Meanwhile, three political parties also pushed forward their own versions of an amnesty bill. Instead of selecting any one of them, Parliament established a special committee, known as the Amnesty Committee, in February 2024 with representatives from all political parties to study the framework for drafting an amnesty law.

The committee met for six months, releasing a report in July 2024 to be presented to the House of Representatives. The report proposed three options for 'sensitive cases' such as those under Section 112: no amnesty, unconditional amnesty, and conditional amnesty.

Political detainees from 2006 to 2024 gathering for a photograph at Parliament on 11 Feb 2024, as part of the campaign to collect signatures for the People's Amnesty Bill. (Photo by Ginger Cat.)

A House majority acknowledged the report’s content. However, the recommendations intended to guide the Cabinet in drafting future legislation—which could have alleviated the situation for political detainees and prisoners—were voted down.

Only 11 MPs from the Pheu Thai Party joined members of the People’s Party, Fair Party, and Thai Progress Party in supporting the recommendations. Cholnan Srikaew, a Pheu Thai MP, explained that a majority in the party had concerns that including 'sensitive cases' could exacerbate political conflicts.

Additionally, obligations such as conditions for dropping charges at the police or prosecutor level, deferring cases, or granting bail in court, were seen as interference by the legislative branch with the authority of the executive and judicial branches.

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A few days after the committee's recommendations were rejected, the Pheu Thai Party announced that it would draft its own Amnesty bill to complement the four existing ones.

Chusak Sirinin, a Pheu Thai MP, stated that the draft follows a resolution by a majority of the party to exclude from any amnesty those convicted under Sections 110 (violence against the Queen, Heir-apparent or Regent) and 112 of the Criminal Code.

The draft should have arrived at Parliament on December 12, but so far nothing has been submitted.

The four existing bills come from the People’s Party, Ruam Thai Sang Chart (United Thai Nation) Party, New Palangdharma Party and Thai Teachers for People Party, each with a different interpretation of what political amnesty should mean.

For example, the civil society proposal explicitly includes Section 112 in any amnesty, while the Move Forward Party’s draft leaves the matter for committee review. In contrast, the Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party, the Thai Teachers for People Party, and the New Palangdharma Party exclude it from their drafts.

Another point of difference is the treatment of offenses under Section 113 of the Criminal Code (dealing with overthrow of the legislature, executive or judiciary). In the drafts from civil society and the Move Forward Party (now the People’s Party), those involved in coup attempts are excluded from amnesties. The other drafts will amnesty them. The civil society draft does not entirely reject the possibility of granting amnesty to protesters charged under this section.

There is also a difference in the definition of offenses eligible for amnesty. The civil society draft specifies certain offenses for immediate amnesty. In contrast, other drafts define offenses as the basis for bringing cases to a committee for consideration except for the Move Forward Party draft which grants the committee the freedom to decide which offenses to include based on context and motives.

The biggest point of contention revolves around Section 112 cases. Currently, as many as 308 cases are being prosecuted, with 15 individuals incarcerated while fighting charges. 8 people have already been sentenced.

However, resolving the issue in Parliament remains challenging, as the majority in the House of Representatives, including Bhumjaithai, Ruam Thai Sang Chart, and Chart Thai Pattana, firmly opposes including Section 112. Pheu Thai, as the leading party in the government, faces pressure not only from the coalition partners but also internally, with only a minority of its MPs pushing the initiative forward.

Pongpol Yodmuangcharoen, a member of the Special Committee to Study Proposals for Enacting an Amnesty Law and a former Ruam Thai Sang Chart MP candidate, suggested that the solution for Section 112 offenders is to seek a royal pardon after their cases are concluded.

Is conditional amnesty a viable solution?

The situation for Section 112 defendants and offenders remains dim. But the report from the Amnesty Committee contains a small opening via a solution which has not been widely discussed: granting conditional amnesty for Section 112 cases.

On the final day of the Committee meeting, 18 out of 36 members voted in favour of granting amnesty for Section 112 offenders. Among them, 14 supported conditional amnesty, and 4 supported unconditional amnesty. Of the remaining members, 14 opposed amnesty, and 4 abstained.

The Committee report does not specify the conditions for eligibility or what comes after.

Chaitawat Tulathon, the ex-leader of the defunct Move Forward Party, said that conditional amnesty for Section 112 cases aims to facilitate dialogue between the accusers, state officials, and the individuals facing prosecution. To determine the measures that those accused or found guilty must follow, they must present facts to the committee for consideration.

Chaitawat stated that conditional amnesty could address concerns about re-offending. He noted that this model draws inspiration from international practice, where amnesty has been granted in cases involving genocide. Emphasizing that the idea is still in its early stages, Chaitawat added that the committee has yet to discuss the details further.

This approach has two key shortcomings. First, it differs from international precedent, where conditional amnesty is typically granted to human rights violators, not the victims of human rights violations. Those convicted or charged under Section 112 simply exercised the right to free speech, unlike government officials or citizens participating in acts of genocide.

Secondly, there is a potential concern about double standards. Amnesty for victims who simply exercised their right to free speech may be subject to conditions, while human rights violators—such as those who used illegal force to disperse protests or participated in staging a coup—are not subject to the same conditions, despite committing acts that carry more severe penalties.

Participants holding signs depicting political prisoners and banners advocating for amnesty outside Parliament on 12 Dec 2023, the first day of the latest parliamentary session and the day the Pheu Thai Party promised to propose its own amnesty bill. (Photo by Ginger Cat.)

No way forward

Jatupat Boonpattararaksa, a political activist, stated that shutting down the opportunity to discuss the issue in Parliament effectively stifles the movement.

"We must admit that Section 112 is a conflict where it is difficult to find a way to resolve it. And [they] also shut down the parliamentary channel, preventing us from talking about Section 112. Imagine if all of the amnesty passes and only Section 112 remains — there will still be conflict in society. It's not an atmosphere that will resolve the situation. It really should release all sides.”

Jatupat said that unless a way forward is found through parliament, activists will continue to face prolonged imprisonment. For instance, Anon Nampa has already been sentenced to 18 years and 10 months, in addition to a 2-year and 11-month suspended sentence.

Section 112 is becoming a taboo topic. The Move Forward Party, which was dissolved by the Constitutional Court for campaigning to amend Section 112, serves as a key example. Additionally, 44 MPs from the party are waiting to see whether they will face a lifetime ban from politics for signing a bill in parliament to amend 112.

When former Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin was ousted for appointing Phichit Chuenban as Minister to the Prime Minister's Office, despite Phichit's lack of qualifications, the coalition parties reiterated their unified opposition to supporting any prime minister candidate associated with amending Section 112.

Under pressure from coalition partners, the new Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, said that Section 112 was not open for discussion. This announcement came just before the Amnesty Committee's report was submitted to Parliament, which included recommendations for the Cabinet to consider amnesty for Section 112 cases.

"If the amnesty does not include Section 112, there will be questions it is a political case just the same, but why can’t it be done. And there will be no way for those affected by Section 112 to get out and live as fathers of their children, as heads of their families. They will have no way out at all," said Jatupat.

"If [we] look from our perspective, the 2020-2021 protests were one hope, but they were blocked. So it comes back to the same issue: a minority that has a lot of power constantly trying to prevent change. They do not allow changes to the political structure. We proposed structural changes regarding democracy or the drafting of the constitution, but the elite owners of the country do not allow any structural changes," Jatupat said.

Jatupat believes that the elite not only refuse to listen but also view those advocating for change as enemies. While the protests have ceased, the prosecution of protesters continues, and those imprisoned face increasingly extended sentences. Jatupat said that he no longer has any expectations of the criminal justice system, as it denies them the opportunity to even prove the facts behind their criticisms.

There have been several instances where the courts did not issue summons for evidence related to the facts behind criticisms of the monarchy, despite requests from the defence.

Examples include the September 19th protest and the letter campaign to King Rama X. In the case related to the Harry Potter protest, the court even ruled that Anon's attempt to present evidence violated the monarchy under Section 6 of the Constitution, and led to confusion and disruption of governance.

Anon Nampa giving a speech at the Harry Potter protest on 3 Aug 2020 in front of a McDonald's at the Democracy Monument.

How many cases?

The Amnesty Committee faced challenges in obtaining accurate data from the justice system, as the statistics do not differentiate politically motivated cases from others. Additionally, the cases categorized by sections of the law do not specify the number of offenders involved in each case, complicating efforts to estimate how many individuals might be granted amnesty.

The Amnesty Committee’s meeting minutes state that according to the Office of the Judiciary—the only institution where data is systematically collected—a total of 1,493 cases related to Sections 110–112 of the Penal Code, which pertain to offenses against the monarchy, were brought to court over an 18-year period, from 2005 to February 2024.

• 2005–2008: 266 cases
• 2009–2012: 357 cases
• 2013–2019: 532 cases
• 2020–2024: 338 cases

The data still does not say how many cases are exclusively related to Section 112. In addition, there is a challenge in defining what constitutes a "political case."

Over the past 18 years, there have been numerous Section 112 cases in which individuals with mental health conditions, such as schizophrenia, were prosecuted in the same manner as other cases.

Although many of these were dismissed, some individuals were still sentenced, as the courts argued that the accused still had sufficient awareness at the time of the offense, such as cases involving the destruction of a royal portrait.

According to data from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), between 2014 and 2019, out of 65 individuals in 55 cases prosecuted under Section 112 with schizophrenia were for whom the organization provided legal assistance, 10 had psychiatric illness.

Arguably, these individuals were affected by the political nature of the law itself. According to TLHR, at least 276 individuals were involved in 308 Section 112 cases during the period between 2020 and 2024of youth protests demanding political reform.

Of these cases, 169 have been adjudicated, with only 19 dismissed.  All the acquittals were because the defendants contested the charges in court. The court verdicts can be classified as follows:

• 85 cases: Imprisonment without suspension
  • 50 cases: Defendants fought the charges
  • 35 cases: Defendants pleaded guilty
• 55 cases: Imprisonment but with a suspended sentence
  • 44 cases: Defendants fought the charges
  • 11 cases: Defendants pleaded guilty
• 4 cases: Court dismissed Section 112 charges but convicted on other charges
• 3 cases: Court acquitted some defendants but convicted others
• 4 cases: Defendants pleaded guilty, and the court suspended sentencing

Surveys of data from 2005 to 2024 conducted by Prachatai and Thai Lawyers for Human Rights found that most cases involving the Red Shirts resulted in imprisonment, with the sentences now completed.

If the amnesty laws pass without including Section 112, the remaining cases will primarily involve leaders of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), both of which paved the way for military coups. Some individuals from the more recent 2020–2021 protests would also still benefit from the amnesty.

Even if their cases are resolved, it remains uncertain whether criminal records will be expunged as part of the provisions. If so, this could significantly improve these individuals' prospects for finding employment and rebuilding their lives.

Appendix 1: Comparison of 4 Draft Amnesty Bills

Appendix 2: Sections Eligible for Amnesty

Notes:

1. NCPO stands for the National Council for Peace and Order, the official name of the military junta that governed Thailand from 2014 to 2019.

2. The Promoting a Peaceful Society Bill was originally submitted in 2022 by the New Palangdharma Party, led by Ravee Maschamadol but was not taken up for consideration. After the 2024 general election, in which the New Palangdharma Party failed to secure any parliamentary seats, the Thai Teachers for People Party, holding just one MP seat, resubmitted the proposal under the same title. Shortly thereafter, the Ruam Thai Sang Chart Party submitted its own version of the bill, also retaining the original name.