OPINION / SOUTHEAST ASIA

Never has Asean shot itself in the foot so grandiosely. By promising so much but delivering so little in its much-touted charter, Asean's credibility in the eyes of the world has consequently been eroded. To be sure, the signed charter is not completely insignificant. It has codified not just Asean's functional norms from the milestone 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation but also has stipulated loftier goals concerning domestic behaviour of the 10 member states on such issues as the rule of law, good governance, democracy, human rights, and basic civil liberties.

However, these goals are mentioned perfunctorily without compliance mechanisms. Member states ultimately can pick and choose which of these non-binding objectives they are willing to fulfil.

On the downside, the charter has unwittingly fortified Asean's ever-inviolable principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This regional hands-off approach, fundamental to the ''Asean way'' of regionalisation, reflects the cold reality of Asean's dominance by its weakest links _ its inner workings by the lowest common denominator.

When the charter was first drafted by Asean's Eminent Persons Group, its prospects were much brighter. On the eve of Asean's 40th anniversary, the draft charter was billed as a profound blueprint that would raise Asean's integration on par with such regional bodies as the European Union.

The buzzwords of the draft included enforcement, compliance, economic community, democracy, human rights council and majority voting over consensus. But the draft was gradually diluted as member states pored over its implications.

It then ran into a brick wall when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's infamous military junta, launched a brutal crackdown on Buddhist monks and other pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets of Rangoon and Mandalay.

Suddenly, Asean's weakest link reasserted itself. The charter-drafting exercise entered a damage-control mode. The final document that was signed at the Asean Summit last week was not short of an appeasement to the SPDC.

But Burma's junta, which partly outflanked Asean's leverage by catering to China and India, was accompanied by a strong supporting cast of the newer Asean members, particularly Vietnam, which are wary of democracy promotion and human rights protection. Indeed, Vietnam's recent arrests of pro-democracy activists quietly attest to Asean's limitations in promoting political values that would engender greater international credibility.

Even in its defanged form, the Asean charter may still not see its light of day. Philippine President Gloria Arroyo threw a spanner in the works by indicating that the Philippine congress might not ratify the document unless Burma returns to democratic rule and Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest.

While the rest of Asean was ready to declare success and go home, President Arroyo's point was spot on. The charter was pointless unless the situation in Burma changes positively toward the path of democracy and human rights. These political values were the impetus in crafting the charter in the first place. The lack of progress on them, most conspicuously in Burma, would betray the charter.

Ms Arroyo's inconvenient reminder to her summit colleagues came on the back of Asean's unwillingness to hear UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari's address to the 10-member group. Denying Mr Gambari a chance to speak to Asean was a snub to the UN, yet another move that eroded Asean's international credibility. Instead, Asean had to spin Mr Gambari's sideline meetings on his mission to Burma with individual Asean leaders as a significant consolation.

Thailand's role in the charter-drafting process and at the summit has been remarkably muted and docile for a country that has been at the forefront of Asean's formation and institutional maturity from the outset. Perhaps it was too much to expect an interim government appointed by a military junta, led by a former army commander in chief, to make much noise. Yet a similar coup-appointed caretaker government under Mr Anand Panyarachun played a leading role in initiating the Asean Free Trade Area in 1992.

Thailand has long been Asean's ''frontline'' state _ vis-a-vis Cambodia in the 1970s and '80s and Burma in the last two decades. But all's quiet from this frontline state since its latest coup in September 2006. A vocal position from Bangkok would have gone a long way in shaping the charter and putting pressure on the SPDC for constructive change in Rangoon.

With its crucial summit now over and its scarcely relevant charter signed, Asean is now back to square one. Its limitations have been laid bare, its runaway ambition to become a legal, integrated entity anywhere near the EU having turned into folly. It has taken a baby step forward but pretends to the world that this is a giant leap. Instead of upgrading its political values by focusing on majority voting, democracy promotion, human rights protection, and compliance, Asean's highly proclaimed charter has turned into a regional exhibit for Burma's intransigent internal repression and blatant disregard for basic civil liberties.

The charter project, in hindsight, was misguided and naively conceived, broached by misplaced overconfidence and manifested in utter disappointment.

The silver lining of hope for both Asean and Thailand rests on the Thai election on Dec 23. With former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan poised to lead Asean as its new secretary-general and his former Democrat party in contention to head the post-election coalition government, Thai foreign policy momentum and Asean's renewed progress can still be regained.

Mr Surin is famous for having proposed the policy of ''flexible engagement'' to prod change in Rangoon while he was foreign minister. His leadership of Asean will come at a critical time. Faced with great expectations, Mr Surin's daunting task will test his mettle. He will simultaneously have the benefit and challenge of presiding over an Asean that has sunk to some of its lowest depths.

A Democrat party-led government in Thailand may well see Democrat stalwarts run Thai foreign policy, including former Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Kraisak Choonhavan and M R Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Mr Surin's deputy minister in the late 1990s.

If Bangkok is to make a difference on Asean's Burma conundrum, a Democrat-led foreign policy team holds much promise. If Asean's secretary-general is to do the same, Mr Surin is first among equals to rejuvenate the grouping. This implicit and serendipitous one-two combination could still rescue Thailand's foreign policy standing and move Asean forward towards its newly signed objectives.

The writer is director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.