An academic of the Intellectual Deep South Watch (IDSW) has told Prachatai that statistical data on violent incidents in the deep south collected from three sources, including the Science Faculty of Prince of Songkhla University, the media and IDSW, show a similar trend. In the first half of 2007 the number of incidents and injuries, mostly among military and police personnel, increased, while during July-August the number of incidents still increased, but with fewer fatalities as many were acts involving felling trees, and burning down houses, schools and telephone booths.

However, despite the fewer fatalities, the number of injuries and deaths did not come down, which means there was an increase in the number of fatalities in each fatal incident. And most of those who were injured and killed turned out to be ordinary people.

The source said, under conditions of anonymity, that explosives have been used less frequently, and about 40 percent of deaths were from gunshots. "Who fired the gunshots?" he asked.

"We don't know who. But we know that they were better sharpshooters, and the targets shifted from the police and military to ordinary people," he said.

The source said that in the last 3-4 months the military have used the tactic of surrounding villages, searching and making arrests. The military also use devices to detect gunpowder residues to arrest suspects.

The fact that there were fewer fatal incidents but more casualties each time might be explained in two ways: the insurgency has turned to soft targets, or ordinary villagers, in response to the military's enclosure tactic; or it was the authorities themselves who were clearing their blacklists.

The source said the roundups, searches and arrests might reduce the number of incidents in the short term, but the military suppression operations could backfire in the long run if badly executed.

According to the source, the military have been trying to demolish the secretive organization of the insurgency through sweeping arrests to create fear, suspicion and rifts among the militants. He thinks this strategy may prove dangerous in the long term.

"The roundups and sweeping arrests have made local people, Buddhists and Muslims alike, and even local bureaucrats feel worried. Like, the Buddhists or the bureaucrats may be anxious that the insurgency will counterattack, while the Muslims may be worried that the authorities will come to make more arrests. The military believe that this works. They arrest some people and tell the other villagers that some particular persons have made confessions."

What the military wish to see happen is a culling among the militants themselves. The source is worried the trick would only lead to more hatred against the Thai state, and might push more people to join the insurgency.

Peace still out of sight

The source thinks the Thai state is trying to solve the problem in immediate military terms without a long-term plan. What can be foreseen now is that the unrest will still continue for a long time, probably 10-20 years.

The long-term solution would be to revive livelihoods with sufficient resources, to provide proper education in the Muslim context, and to provide jobs. Currently, over 80% of Muslim adolescents are jobless, and as they have been to local Islamic schools, they cannot easily enter the mainstream higher education in universities, said the source.

Currently there is a malaria outbreak in the three southern border provinces, while local health workers tend to relocate themselves somewhere else, resulting in poorer access to health care for local people.

Meanwhile, the government's restitution programmes are not cohesive, with each agency doing its own job: the Public Health Ministry cares for psychological health, the Interior Ministry hands out money, and the Education Ministry gives away scholarships.

Currently, the restitution programmes mainly involve money, which makes the victim families rely only on compensation which will never be sufficient. Real restitution would be to help them rely on themselves. Therefore, self-reliance is a big question, the source said.

The source said a proposal by the Independent Committee for National Reconciliation to have dual official languages in these provinces is acceptable. The Malay dialect is the local people's identity. The Thai state must be broad-minded enough to win the people's hearts. Otherwise, they deserve to have their own country. If we cannot take care of them, we should let them, the source said.

However, the source believes the Thai state can take care of the people in the southern border provinces, if only it opens its mind and reorganizes itself, so that separation is not necessary.

"I think the idea of a certain extent of autonomy is worth considering; that is, their own education administration, proper health services that fit the Muslim way of life, and their own natural resource management without external exploitation. But as of now both the authorities and the insurgency are not yet ready for negotiations, because each thinks it is holding the upper hand. They will talk only when they are exhausted. We only have to wait and see."

Translated by Ponglert Pongwanan