The Pridi Banomyong Institute organized a public discussion on 9 September 2007 entitled "Before the first anniversary of 19 September 2006 Coup, what has Thai society learned?" moderated by Sinsawat Yodbangtoey.

"... the patronage system poses a challenge to democratization and social justice. 

Jon Ungphakorn, Chair of NGO-COD, said that four lessons have been learned from the past eleven months. First, the conflict that the people's movement had against the Thaksin government is different from the ongoing polarization.

During Thaksin's tenure, people's organizations fought against the government on various fronts. For example, they were opposed to attempts by the government to curtail freedom including media freedom and public space. Gross human rights violations in the three Southernmost provinces has led to incessant killings of people including the massacre at Krue Se mosque, and the mass killing of members of a football team in Saba Yoi district. The "war on drugs" led to the rampant slaughter of people by the police and more than 2,000 lives were lost without anyone being found guilty. And illegal manipulation of the legislature including recruiting political cronies into the independent organizations disrupted the system of internal checks and balances.

It was an example of a government that came through a democratic election with landslide victories, which, despite its potential to make an immense contribution to society, simply misused its powers, cared only about strengthening its own position, and reduced the space for listening to people. It pushed many policies without being interested in what the people could accept or not, such as the privatization of state utilities like the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), university privatization, etc. Therefore, the Thaksin government was not a democratic government, but was sustained by a democratic process.

Anyhow, Acharn Jon does not agree with the coup. Though he was relieved that the Thaksin government was at last gone, he could not endorse the method. He believes that Thaksin government would eventually have crumbled in the face of people's power as the uprisings on 14 October 1973 and May 1992 have shown. And people's power could tackle social crises.

Currently, two major factions are fighting head on, namely, those patronized by Thaksin vs. those by the CNS (Council for National Security). Even after the forthcoming election, the conflict will go on. Another coup cannot be ruled out, should those patronized by the CNS not gain significant power through the election. The stakes in this conflict are high. If the Thaksin wing loses, they will lose a lot of money, and if the CNS faction loses, they would retaliate. Nevertheless, all these conflicts neither benefit the people, nor strengthen democracy and social justice. This will leave us with a weak administration susceptible to another coup.

Second, neither the Thaksin government nor the CNS-backed administration works for the public interest. The policies of the Thaksin government which were severely criticized by civil society have been adopted by the CNS-backed government as well, though in a different manner. For example, to curb media freedom, Thaksin used his patronage, power and influence to gain direct control, whereas the CNS has gained long term control over people through laws that violate rights issued by a legislature whose members had been handpicked by the CNS. In sum, both regimes are both dangerous.

Third, the patronage system poses a challenge to democratization and social justice. But both the Thaksin and CNS regimes have used this system to whip people into either of the two factions. Just as Thaksin controlled government officials, the CNS used them to force people to accept the draft Constitution and governors from the provinces that rejected the draft charter had to face the music.

The people's movement needs to be firm on its stand. However, to stay out of the patron-client system does not rule out the possibility of engaging with the CNS. But we need to interact with them on an equal basis, just as we have done with previous governments. We can raise our concern to the powers that be, but we shall not fall under their patronage.

Jon believes in the power of the people. The privatization of EGAT during Thaksin's time has failed because of the staunch opposition from the people. The Internal Security Bill will not be easily tabled for deliberation by the legislature because of the people's movement. We should not feel too hopeless.

Even though he believes some leading members among the coup-makers are good people or sufficiently democratic, no one can be good without being put under sufficient scrutiny.

Anusorn Dhamjai, member of the Pridi Banomyong Institute Board of Directors, said he would like to reiterate his stand against any undemocratic process. The coup has had serious impacts on various fronts.

First, concerning politics, to solve political conflicts and crises, one has to abide by the principles and processes of democracy. Failing to do so results in more complicated problems. It seemed like the problems had gone after the 19 September coup, but actually they had not. Since the problems stemmed from structural conflicts, not individuals, replacing Thaksin with CNS, or vice versa, would not solve the problem. The issues are simply suppressed and the conflicts will go on and on. The best way to deal with conflicts is to rely on democratic processes and let the people decide.

Second, in terms of foreign affairs, the 19 September coup simply drew attention from international community to the conflict. And unavoidably, players from other countries become involved as we are in the age of globalization. In the current borderless world of economics and political ideology, elections and human rights are shared values, and they can be cited as a reason for intervention. Even though the crises can be handled by Thai society itself, there is now doubt as to our transparency, and that explains why the European Union is keen on monitoring the next election.

Third, from the outset, it looks like the 2007 Constitution made possible by the 19 September coup has been drafted through a democratic process. The referendum was organized as a ritual to make people feel the Constitution belongs to them, even though many provisions are not at all democratic and simply foster more power among the politicians and bureaucrats. This is most obvious in the recruitment of senators by both election and appointment. This shows a lack of confidence in people's power. They do not believe that the people can elect someone based on prudent decision-making. Villagers are thought to be easily bought. The election is looked on as a factor that weakens political parties and the resulting government is not efficient and not able to manage anything. The politicians will simply compete for posts in the government and the next coup will be unavoidable.

Fourth, political innovations and new discourses have been cooked up to persuade the international community to accept the dinosaur coup. They try to convince people that they are not traditional dictators. Even though he believes some leading members among the coup-makers are good people or sufficiently democratic, no one can be good without being put under sufficient scrutiny.

Fifth, it will take at least ten more years for the structural conflicts to unravel. These conflicts do not exist just between the old power vs. the CNS, but also among members of the old power who want to ally with the new power. These conflicts will become more visible after the appointment of the new Commander in Chief. Anusorn notes, however, that this army chief position is simply the equivalent of the directorship of a department, so it should not be a big deal. But the appointment is treated as important since the army still holds powers over politics.

Sixth, even though Gen. Surayud wants the election to be held as soon as possible, but some members of the CNS simply want to put if off fearing that it will restore the domination of the old power.

According to Khun Anusorn, even though continued monopolization of power by Thaksin was harmful, the coup has had a serious impact on the economy. The effects are immediate since a coup is no longer welcome by the international community and that has resulted in the Thai government and the Thai economy being boycotted, denied cooperation on various fronts, and investment sector being disrupted.

The coup has cost Thailand an important opportunity to capitalize on the 2006-2007golden years of the Asian economy. Anyhow, it was lucky that the coup took place in the golden year, so our economy has not been affected too much and managed a four percent increase of GDP. Had the coup taken place during an economic recession, an investment crisis would have happened.

At the very least, the 19 September coup has convinced the Thai people that they are always susceptible to coups. Our immunity against coups is very weak and unfortunately, the country has not been governed under the rule of law as one Constitution after another has been torn up. Those who hold power control the country's direction. They have absolute power to steer people and care little about the rule of law and legitimacy. By relying on individuals rather than the system, the problems will become even more entangled and hard to unravel.

"The next question is how many more coups will it take for the Thai people to learn that a coup never leads to any solution and it can never be treated as a solution to democracy and Thai society" 

Pravit Rojanapruek, reporter from The Nation, elaborated five points. First, impression over the past year of the coup and the role of the military reveals that there has been no change. The pro-coup groups still support the military, whereas the anti-coup groups shun them. The coup and news about it have certainly become part of everyday life. The media often ask if there will be another coup. Meanwhile, the media and general public feel indifferent toward the coup and accept that Thai society has to live with the risk political accidents and a militaristic culture, which are accepted as normal.

"The next question is how many more coups will it take for the Thai people to learn that a coup never leads to any solution and it can never be treated as a solution to democracy and Thai society?"

From another perspective, it seems Thai society has not come to terms with the role of the military. After the coup, the military got involved with many things including directing the traffic, sitting on the board of directors of the Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited (AOT) and TOT Public Company Limited (TOT). Moreover, reports on the appointment of the next army chief have become a breathtaking issue for Thai society. It reminds us the time when the military was high up, and the appointment of the new army chief was very important. It shows how politics or even society is led by the military.

"Therefore, to solve problems by force seems to be acceptable among the middle class. How can we differentiate between this use of force to find a solution and the war on drugs during the time of Thaksin?"

Second, what have we learned from this reconciliation mantra? In Khun Pravit's opinion, the term is problematic and we have not yet learned anything new. The notion has been imposed by the powers that be to suppress dissent in society. And the pro-coup side still believes that a coup can lead to the end of divisions.

"I just want to ask, after one year, have the conflicts ceased to exist? If not, why not?"

A clear answer was shown in the previous referendum in which up to 40% of the voters nationwide rejected the draft Constitution.

If reconciliation means the attempt to make people think identically, to make them love the same people, the same parties, then this kind of reconciliation is no different from dictatorship.

According to Khun Pravit, an alternative notion that should be promoted is the skill to co-exist peacefully, to refrain from using violence to solve problems, including the silencing of drug traffickers, or the killing of democracy by a coup. The term "reconciliation" has been made a mockery by dictators to prevent political dissent. It is not so different whether it is used by dictators in military uniforms or by tycoons in suits.

Dissent and conflict should be treated as part of normal life in society. What matters is how we manage them. Unfortunately, people are now forced to think the same, and become somewhat like monoculture which is vulnerable to locusts.

Third, after the coup, Thai society has learned more about the poor who were scorned as idiots when they voted for Thaksin. The accusations that these poor folks are stupid, uneducated and therefore end up voting for Thaksin are made by the middle class who never accept the voting election results or the constitution referendum.

One year later, the middle class still holds on to the same thinking and uses the same old reasons to approach the referendum. It comes as no surprise as the 2007 Constitution requires the appointment of half of the senators and martial law will not be lifted soon even though the EU and USA have demanded it.

There seems to be no learning among the middle class, and they tend to accept the limited choices available. They are no different from other middle classes who are well educated and business folk who endorsed the Constitution hoping that it would speed up the election and restore the economy. Is this a short-term view? Who thinks short-term? And who thinks more about themselves?

Fourth, has the impression toward Thaksin changed? Those who hated him still really dislike him, whereas those who adored him still feel enchanted by him. This black and white perception is still there and there have been no attempts to think out of the box.

Despite all the cheating, the referendum was the first time for the rural poor to realize their powerful voice in politics. Their rejection of the draft constitution has proven their existence and the middle class should learn to coexist with them and together try to forge solutions for a reconciliatory society.

Fifth, what have we learned about the role and position of the monarchy? Undeniably, coverage of the role of the monarchy behind the coup spilled all over the Western media. The name of the coup makers' group - "Council for Democratic Reform with the King as the Head of State" - already implied that, not to mention the call to invoke Section 7 in the 1997 Constitution prior to the coup. Yet, debates about the appropriate role of the monarchy in Thai politics and society are still avoided in the mainstream media. They simply lurk in some corners of cyber space. Lately, according to the Financial Times, two Thai nationals were nabbed for criticizing the monarchy, an act which could constitute a criminal offence under the new Cyber Crime Act used by the authorities in lieu of the lèse majesté law.

What I want to ask is will this culture last for another 20 years? If we still have to rely on the monarchy then, what will the society be like? In the past one year, this "yellow fever" has been vehemently propped up for the first time in history since the turn to democracy. It is worrying as people who want to think ahead or be critical have to keep that in mind, and the best chance they can express themselves is through gossip.

"...the four justifications for the coup that Saprang Kalayanamitr has claimed to achieve, have in fact never materialized. The coup-makers have failed completely on all four.

Suthachai Yimprasert, a lecturer from the Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, said that the four justifications for the coup that Saprang Kalayanamitr has claimed to achieve, have in fact never materialized. The coup-makers have failed completely on all four.

First, divisions in society have not been resolved. They still exist not only between the pro-Thaksin side vs. the CNS, but also between pro-coup and anti-coup since a coup is out of place in present society and not acceptable to the people.

Conflicts can be resolved if every party feels justice has been delivered to them equally. But the punishment of disbanding the Thai Rak Thai Party and imposing a five-year loss of political rights on its 111 executive members was not legitimized by conventional laws, but on the orders of the CDR. In Dr Suthachai's opinion, it would be better if the party had been disbanded under conventional laws, not the CDR's decrees. In addition, the ex post facto law and the blanket punishment of 111 persons without deliberation of individual guilt, contravenes the universal rule of law. Therefore, conflicts shall never cease if the laws are enforced unfairly.

Second, the Thaksin government was accused of interfering with independent organizations. But at present, the independent organizations are controlled by the CNS since they have been appointed by the CNS. According to the 2007 Constitution, almost all independent organizations that have been set up by CNS will continue to operate until the end of their terms, and the retirement age of judges is going to be delayed. This could be construed as reciprocation.

Third, concerning the accusation of corruption, it is not clear even now what laws can be used to charge Thaksin with corruption. While ordering the freezing of Thaksin's assets, they forgot that earlier they simply accused Thaksin of ethical offences, not legal offences. So if they think Thaksin should pay the taxes, the laws should be amended to make it a requirement and they should be applied equally to everybody. But their failure to have the law amended means that they think it is alright. So how can they bring any charges?

According to Dr Suthachai, Thaksin might have committed just one offence, moving money through Ample Rich. But the ex-PM should be fined at most one or two billion, not the whole 73 billion baht he earned from selling the stocks since that included his investment as well.

Fourth, concerning lèse majesté, Dr Suthachai noted that no one has been accused of committing this crime. He saw only the military using the name of the Council for Democratic Reform "with the King as the Head of State" to claim they conducted the coup "under a monarchy".

As for things that have not been addressed, Dr Suthachai noted that the coup has derailed the whole economy. The defence budget has been increased, along with more military positions, and martial law has been retained, even though Thailand has no hostile neighbours. So martial law is imposed even though there is no martial cause.

We have a people-phobic constitution as they fear people will have too much power so their power has to be compromised. But they could not curtail people's power too blatantly, and so they were allowed a rubber-stamp vote in the referendum. This 2007 Constitution is the most pro-bureaucratic-polity version since 1977. In the 31 years since the 6 October 1976 event, we have lived through seven Constitutions. It is surprising that since the first Constitution drafted in 1973, when Mr. Meechai Ruchupan was one of the 13 drafters, he has been involved in drafting all seven Constitutions.

"The CNS said the military reshuffle is a matter for the military and neither the government nor politicians should have a hand in this. No one knows better than the military. But why then does the CNS interfere with the administration?" 

Prasit Piwawattanapanich, lecturer from the Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, said that he agreed with Jon that using people's power to pressurize Thaksin government was effective enough, and the coup was not necessary. Had the election taken place as planned, and the Thaksin government returned to power again, they would not do what they had done during the Thaksin 1 and Thaksin 2 governments as Thai society would have learned a lot by then. Unfortunately, the process was disrupted by the coup, and instead of moving forward, we have regressed.

Also, in Dr Prasit's opinion as long as Section 112 of the Penal Code has not been revoked, free expression will not happen. The provision is still retained even though His Majesty the King has stated that he is not beyond criticism.

What Thai society has not learned is that a coup never helps to solve national problems. Since the 1946 coup by Pin Choonhawan, excuses have always been made to justify coups including national decline, rampant corruption, and defamation of the king. Even today theses excuses are still used. If a coup could really bring us a solution, all these alleged threats must have gone. But they still persist. Thai people should have learned by now that a coup can never be a solution.

Another thing is the drafting of constitutions, and after a coup, we get busy drafting a new charter, one after another. We are now living under the 18^th Constitution. And there is a good chance of having a 19^th or 20^th constitution as well. Constitution drafting has been touted as a panacea and the drafters claim it is a solution. But according to Dr Prasit, constitutionality is not confined just to the constitution. It does not matter how well we draft it, as democracy might not happen anyway. The quality of democracy exists beyond the written charter. It lives off a democratic culture which accepts the rule of the majority while respecting minority voices. It promotes criticism and the rule of law. But Thai society has never learned that a lack of this kind of democracy cannot be addressed by written provisions in a constitution. For example, it is written in the 1997 Constitution that people have the right to oppose a coup, but in reality they couldn't. A code of conduct for politicians is eloquently written into the 2007 Constitution, but it does not mean that when it comes into force, all politicians will be instantly clean. It will take generations for this to happen and it will happen through education. But no government has promoted such education. Therefore, democracy is something we have to wait for patiently, and there is no shortcut. Using the tanks will not bring about it, and that is a thoughtless idea.

Another thing that we have not learned is that coups are no longer acceptable in the international community. It is regarded as a symbol of underdevelopment. Surprisingly, the powers that be and the pro-coup academics do not realize the far-reaching damage.

What Dr Prasit has learned personally is there is actually no neutrality despite his hope to see it in the media, among academics, in the Asset Scrutiny Committee or among members of the Privy Council. As advisors to the King, who is supposed to stay aloof from politics, the Privy Councillors should be more cautious when they express themselves or act in public, otherwise, this may affect the King.

In addition, Dr Prasit feels there is no ethics or virtue as such, otherwise there would not have been the Khao Yai Thiang case (in which the Prime Minister is accused of owning land in a forest reserve), or the double marriage registration (where General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin is accused of registering his second marriage without revoking the first one), and the occupation of state residences. To be a good person, one can be inspired by parents or teachers. But one will not become good simply because she or he is led to be so.

The principle of supremacy of civilian governments over the military can help to prevent a coup, but it has not been well-rooted in Thai society. After the 1992 uprising, military officers went back to their barracks and became professional soldiers. But after this coup, they have been more involved, and now the media are speculating who is going to be the next army chief.

"The CNS said the military reshuffle is a matter for the military and neither the government nor politicians should have a hand in this. No one knows better than the military. But why then does the CNS interfere with the administration?" 

Another thing that we have learned is the "legal servants" have become more skilled. The laws and regulations have been drafted more skilfully, including Section 309 in the 2007 Constitution which pardons coups in advance. The charter has been drafted to hand power back to the bureaucrats and take it away from politicians. Basic state policies are already set out, so political parties cannot compete on policies. Eventually, the new Constitution may address certain issues created by the previous one, but will also engender new problems as well.

Last but not least, what has Thai society learned concerning the meaning of constitutional monarchy? Dr Prasit opined that Thai people have to try to understand the term better. And with a good understanding, there will no longer be a call to invoke Section 7, which symbolizes regression. But of course, the coup by comparison pushed the country backward even more. It's time that Thai society learned the meaning of constitutional monarchy.

Translated by Pipob Udomittipong