Provincial police commanders told a Senate Committee that the government had decided to disperse the red shirts on 19 May without telling them, so they were not quick enough to prevent the burning of provincial halls. Local people are unhappy with the government’s accusation that the red shirts are trying to overthrow the monarchy, they said.
On 28 June, the Senate Committee following up the political situation, chaired by appointed senator Wicharn Sirichaiakekawat, met former provincial police commanders, including Pol Maj Gen Sakda Tachakriangkrai from Khon Kaen, Pol Maj Gen Pramote Iamthat from Mukdahan, Pol Maj Gen Decha Chaibunchom from Udon Thani, and Pol Maj Gen Sompong Thongweeraprasert from Ubon Ratchathani, all of them having been transferred to stand-by jobs at the National Police Bureau after provincial halls in their provinces were burned down on 19 May.
All the police commanders told the Senate Committee that they had not expected that the situation would escalate as on 18 May a group of senators were trying to negotiate with the red-shirt leaders and the government, which was a good sign. On the morning of 19 May, however, the government conducted the operations at Ratchaprasong, and they felt disappointed.
They said that they had insufficient forces and equipment to provide security in their areas. Their men were outnumbered ten-to-one by protesters, because their personnel had been assigned to be deployed in Bangkok. They tried to negotiate and not use arms against the people, as they were aware that they would have to continue to work with them.
They blamed poor coordination with the central authorities for not knowing that the government would disperse the protesters on the morning of 19 May, so they were unprepared to provide security. Nevertheless, they took photos and video of the incidents, and subsequently made arrests of the perpetrators.
According to all four police commanders, the protesters told police that they came out to demand true democracy, and felt insulted and angry with the double standards in law enforcement and the accusation that they were anti-monarchy.
Pol Maj Gen Pramote said that the red shirts in Mukdahan were mostly ex-communists and others including the descendants of Vietnamese who had just acquired Thai nationality. Interestingly, there were no Phuea Thai MPs in the province. The protesters started to gather on 17 May, asking for permission to use the area next to the provincial hall. On the morning of 19 May, a red-shirt community radio station announced at 6 am that the military was dispersing the red shirts at Ratchaprasong with people injured, and urged listeners to come to the provincial hall. Their number was growing into thousands. The police force in Mukdahan consisted of only 700 troops, with one company having just been sent to be stationed at Lumpini Station in Bangkok, leaving only about 500. With insufficient forces and a vast area, they could not handle the situation. The Emergency Decree had also yet to be declared for the province, so the police could not use violent means. They lacked equipment to follow the 7-step international standard procedure announced by the CRES, having only water trucks. And they were not allowed to use guns.
Pol Maj Gen Sompong said that the red shirts in Ubon Ratchathani had been active. On 16 May, they closed down a bridge connecting districts, and burned tyres in some places. The provincial governor gave instructions to hold negotiations, as burning tyres was not so serious. Once this was reported to the central authorities, it probably seemed severe, so the government declared a state of emergency that night. On the night of 18 May, there were two companies of riot police, with one company having been sent to Bangkok.
He said he saw a good sign in senators’ negotiations with the UDD and the government, and the military said that the provinces would be informed 12 hours in advance of dispersal. He thought there would be enough time, as mobilizing police force from all districts to the provincial town would take about 4 hours.
However, the dispersal took place in the morning of 19 May to the surprise of everyone in the provincial administration. 300 police were deployed at the provincial hall. At midday, it was reported that the UDD leaders in Bangkok were going to surrender. So the local authorities expected that the situation would improve, and delayed shutting down community radio as had been ordered by the central authorities on 18 May, because the provincial governor said that they should not further infuriate the people. However, the provincial hall was burned down at about 1 pm.
Pol Maj Gen Sompong said that when the hall was being burned, police had only shields and helmets, and not everyone was equipped. Each officer was at least 40 years old. The protesters fired marbles and metal pellets from slingshots, forcing the police to retreat behind the hall, while the firefighters dared not do their job. A fire truck was seized and burned. The 7-step international standard procedure for dispersal was difficult to follow in reality, because people were storming in, and the local police had never used violence against protesters.
‘The concern is that if police use violence and later are found guilty, the superiors who give the order will say that they have given clear instructions to aim below the knee within a distance of 35 meters. But in reality no one will be able to do that. The local police have never been trained for this. When we did not do it, the central authorities saw us as ‘tomato (red) police’. In fact, we have no colour. We have to work with local people, so we know each other very well. What can we do? And they are not terrorists. We’re unlike soldiers who are sent in, do the job and return to barracks, with no need to keep in touch with the people. Looking back, if I had ordered firing on 19 May to protect the provincial hall, and people had been killed, the police would have been blamed. We’re in a difficult position, always subject to abuse by powerful people. When they don’t get what they want, they persecute us. My proposal is that, provided the people have the right to assembly according to the constitution, riot police should be set up as a separate unit, and with no normal police duties. They get trained just for those situations. Otherwise, normal police can hardly do anything,’ he said.
Pol Maj Gen Decha from Udon Thani commented that reconciliation was like a car damaged in a crash. Although it gets repaired, the feelings remain. It needs time, sincerity and consistency from the government. It is best if the car was not crashed in the first place.
Pol Maj Gen Sompong said that the red shirts were likely to continue mobilizing. He had worked on the ground early on. Initially, some protesters were probably paid to come, but as they went along they got hooked and came on their own to hear information from the other side. Both sides presented one-sided information, but the government could not convince local people. Now they appeared quiet because they had just had experiences which severely affected their lives.
The red shirts who he had talked to in Ubon Ratchathani had doubts about the independent panels which were being set up. Some said there were better people than the NIDA rector [Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, Chair of panel on charter amendments], so why were they not chosen. Or some said sarcastically that if the Thammasat rector had been included, it would have made the [yellow] team complete. They did not mention the panels led by Anand and Prawase.
He said that the government talked reconciliation, but was persecuting [red shirts] at the same time. It should stop and allow them to make their stand, because they felt that they had no place to stand.
Pol Maj Gen Sakda said that he had talked to the red shirts in Khon Kaen, and they told him that no one was plotting against the monarchy. He monitored the protests there, and found no mention to the monarchy in their speeches. They sang the royal anthem when they finished. So when the government said that the red shirts were against the monarchy, they felt they were framed. He was afraid that the government’s shutting down all their communication channels would push them to go underground.
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