Powerful political dynasties, known as Baan Yai [big houses], are once again at the centre of debate following the surprise victory of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s conservative Bhumjaithai party (BJT). However, Baan Yai alone cannot explain the victory, which was also secured by a more powerful tool: the machinery of the state.

Official results show that the BJT secured 193 seats, followed by the People’s Party with 118 and the Pheu Thai Party with 74.

The results defied all pre-election polls in the country. Most surveys and analysts projected that the BJT would win between 140 and 160 seats, and none predicted that it would secure nearly 200.

The phenomenon has caused uproar and confusion among the general public, as the party had long been merely a local patronage party but its power has recently expanded at a remarkable pace.

Prachatai spoke with Assoc Prof Viengrat Nethipo from Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science about the mechanisms behind the BJT’s surprising victory.

Why did Baan Yai choose BJT?

According to Viengrat, influential political dynasties or Baan Yai have been widely recognised as a form of political patronage capable of influencing voters’ decision-making in local and national elections.

Baan Yai refers to influential political families that have long maintained local patronage networks. Generation after generation of many of these families run for political positions.

Viengrat added that the term carries a broad meaning which may even extend to distant relatives or former subordinates.

Mass defections of 86 Baan Yai were widely seen as a key factor behind the BJT victory, which benefited from many political dynasties who previously supported the Pheu Thai Party.

According to Viengrat, even though Baan Yai had enjoyed being with the Pheu Thai Party, as the party’s policies helped strengthen their support, the expulsion of the party’s two latest PMs from office and the imprisonment of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra sent negative signals to them.

To survive, they defected to the party with the potential to replace the Pheu Thai Party, the BJT.

For the Baan Yai, the only option that could help strengthen their power was to win the elections and align themselves with the party most likely to form the government.

Being part of the ruling party is particularly important in rural areas, where voters often rely heavily on a patronage network. The ability to control the bureaucratic systems means that the MPs can swiftly solve the problems in their constituencies and demonstrate that they are reliable representatives. 

The Baan Yai have learned that they must be with the ruling party to win over voters. That was another factor why many defected to the BJT.

Vote-buying is not that easy

Viengrat stated that the country witnessed a huge amount of money spent on vote-buying in the elections, even though there was no guarantee that it would lead to victory.

Vote-buying in Thailand is more complicated than it appears on the surface. It is not merely a matter of distributing cash into the hands of voters. The practice is intertwined with the patronage and bureaucratic systems.

In the eyes of those in rural areas, exchanging money for votes reassures them that they can rely on that candidate or that political party, but the money will not be distributed directly by the candidate but through a network of local canvassers, who have influence and are familiar with people in the area.

The money distributed may be skimmed off by these canvassers, or in some cases, never passed on to voters at all, as the local canvassers are often already respected and trusted figures in the community. A simple request may be enough to mobilise support for a certain candidate or party regardless of money.

“Vote-buying is not easy. You have to have a network first,” said Viengrat.. In some cases, local canvassers may be swayed by a rival party offering larger sums to secure support.

For two parties with networks and the ability to control the bureaucratic system, money became the decisive factor to attract local canvassers to their side The political parties also had a short period of only 50 days for their election campaigns. As a result, money became more crucial.

Two coups have destroyed policy-driven politics

Viengrat remarked that political parties as institutions were significantly weakened by the 2006 and 2014 coups. Following the 2006 coup, politicians, particularly from the Pheu Thai Party, faced a series of serious charges.

The 2014 coup signalled that the politicians were closely monitored by the National Council for Peace and Order, with many prominent politicians placed in custody.

After the two coups, the ruling parties were unable to deliver on their promised policies. Viengrat noted that as a result, voters have turned to familiar local figures who have long worked in their communities and helped residents fix their problems. This trend contributed to the strong emergence of Baan Yai MPs in the 2026 elections.

During the 2023 elections, the political divide was clear: pro-coup and anti-coup. Pheu Thai and the People’s Party ranked among the top parties due to the rise of anti-coup sentiment. At the time, Viengrat said, the Baan Yai suffered a significant defeat.

But in the 2026 elections, when this political distinction was less clear, those who effectively leveraged their networks and maintained a long-term presence in their areas tended to secure victory.

The election results also showed that the branding of political parties was no longer a determining factor, as both Pheu Thai and the People’s Party had their own wounds. For the People’s Party, their main strongholds were based in Bangkok and urban areas, where voters are not bound to Baan Yai networks.

Power of Baan Yai combined with bureaucratic control

Critics argued that as PM and Interior Minister, Anutin held the power to reshuffle state officials, particularly provincial governors and district chiefs under the Ministry, in ways that may have favoured his party in the election. As a result, the BJT could control the bureaucratic apparatus while also benefiting from the mass defection of MPs from the Baan Yai.

Provincial governors and district chiefs could, to some extent, be transferred so as to influence village heads and even influential local canvassers. These officials from the bureaucratic system could obstruct the vote buying by a rival party’s canvassers.

Viengrat stated that the tactic regarding bureaucracy-based networks was deployed after the 2014 coup by the military-aligned Palang Pracharath Party, and it helped it secure the highest number of popular votes in the 2019 elections. However, the BJT this time deployed the tactic more effectively.

In addition, the Pheu Thai Party has suffered multiple political setbacks in recent years. The BJT could take advantage of this weakness to build and consolidate its networks, as shown in the 2026 elections. Viengrat reiterated that the defection of Baan Yai MPs alone could not help the BJT to secure a victory of this size, and not every defecting MP was able to win.

It was a battle between Baan Yai with old tactics and the new Baan Yai that embraced both the patronage system and the bureaucratic mechanisms.

Viengrat remarked that this is a weakness for the People’s Party in its attempts to combat the influence of the Baan Yai, while the Pheu Thai Party exploited the networks which had helped secure two consecutive victories for its predecessor, the Thai Rak Thai Party.

However, under former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, some changes in bureaucratic mechanisms increased the power of bureaucrats in the system, while politicians were hesitant to exercise their power, partly out of fear of transgressing the ethical standards outlined in the 2017 Constitution.

Thailand’s bureaucratic system is now stronger than when former PM Thaksin’s party won elections.

“So, anyone, who can control the bureaucratic system and knows how to use it, can win, with the exception of for the previous elections where there was dissatisfaction against the coup,” said Viengrat. The professor added that the support for the BJT from the Deep State also encouraged bureaucrats to assist the party, as it gave them a feeling of security, while backing the wrong side could jeopardise their careers.