With less than a month to go, Thailand is gearing up for a new government amid mounting challenges. Parties are ramping up their election campaigns to capture the voters’ mandate, particularly given the vast number of undecided voters this time. However, the question remains: will the upcoming election bring about significant reform?

While this election introduces new dynamics, analysts observed that the continued influence of the conservative apparatus may limit significant change, with the Bhumjaithai Party, a conservative partner, emerging to contest the vote share from both Pheu Thai and the People’s Party

To gain insight into the upcoming election and the likely post-election political system, Prachatai spoke with Professor Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee from Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science.

Thailand’s next election, scheduled for 8 February, came earlier than expected after Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved the House of Representatives on 11 December 2025 after a disagreement during the parliamentary session on constitutional amendments.

Anutin’s third-largest Bhumjaithai Party assumed power as a minority government in September 2025. The unexpected opportunity came after the removal of former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the Pheu Thai Party over a controversial leaked call with former Cambodian PM Hun Sen regarding the Thai-Cambodian border dispute.

Triangular politics and undecided voters

Siripan observed that the upcoming elections are likely to form a “triangular” scenario where the three main parties—Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai, and People’s Party — would not have a large difference in their vote shares.

She said voters’ decisions are based on two main considerations: economic livelihoods and expectations for the post-election political system. Voters can be classified into three camps: those who favour the status quo; those seeking abrupt structural change; and those preferring gradual change.

Unlike the 2023 elections, where parties were defined by their stance on coup-aligned factions, these lines have blurred for the 2026 elections and no longer serve as a main factor for voters. Each party carries its own wounds, given that Pheu Thai, for instance, formed a coalition government with a party aligned with the coup makers, while the People’s Party voted for Anutin, whose party was known for being pro-military.

Siripan noted that these wounds significantly erode public trust, leaving voters feeling betrayed that their chosen parties abandoned their promises.

Simultaneously, recent polls surprisingly showed that approximately 30-40% of voters have not made a decision. The figure is considered high compared to the previous elections. “If we look at several polls, we will see a group of voters who have already made a decision, by so-called ‘affection voting’, but this time, we see that the group of undecided voters is high, around 30-40%. Optimistically speaking, we might think that Thai society is becoming more conscious, more rational, and more careful in decision-making,” said the professor.

The rising star: Bhumjaithai

The rise of the medium-sized Bhumjaithai party in recent years is fascinating. Once underestimated as merely a local patronage party with strongholds in some provinces in the northeastern region, particularly Buriram, Bhumjaithai has now emerged as a political powerhouse, given its unique and strong patronage system. Siripan said that unlike Pheu Thai, where local influential clans under the party can operate independently, Bhumjaithai requires members under its patronage to follow the party’s policies and direction.

The party has built its own “political machine.” During Anutin’s tenure as a Public Health Minister between 2019 and 2023, for example, he raised the monthly allowance for village health volunteers. It also established good ties with non-political officials in state agencies.

Bhumjaithai’s ability to include technocrats in its government, particularly business executive Suphajee Suthampun, veteran ambassador Sihasak Phuangketkeow, and former Director-General of the Treasury Department Ekniti Nitithanprapas, is another strength. 

“Bhumjaithai is very clever, very ingenious in pulling in technocrats and pulling in well-known business leaders under the party’s apparatus, and it received a good response for society, particularly the middle class,” noted Siripan.

Bhumjaithai has also benefited from “mass migration,” as 65 MPs from other parties have defected to the party. When combined with its remaining 68 MPs, Bhumjaithai now has around 130 MPs in hand. Siripan estimated that the party is likely to gain more seats in provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border, given former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s mishandling of the leaked phone conversation with former Cambodian PM Hun Sen.

Having the opportunity to be in government has allowed the party to use its media channels to communicate directly with the people. The professor viewed this opportunity as “revitalisation,” as the party was previously out of sight. It also allowed Bhumjaithai to promote and deliver its policies, particularly its populist Half-Half Plus scheme, and it has undeniably become a formidable rival in the election arena.

When combined with nationalist sentiment during the Thai-Cambodian conflict, Siripan predicted that the party would definitely gain more seats, perhaps as many as 140. Meanwhile, support for Pheu Thai is expected to decline, and the People's Party could see a gain or a loss. However, the real game-changer is the large pool of undecided voters.

Containment system and lack of unity among the opposition

In the upcoming election, the power to elect the Prime Minister lies with the House of Representatives, directly elected by the people, while the Senate is no longer involved in the process. However, Siripan argued that the 2026 elections will operate under a “containment system” controlled by the elite.

The elite in this context—not just the military—consists of conservative blocs, capital groups, especially monopoly capital groups that benefit from state concessions and privileged access to resources, as well as the so-called independent agencies, the senior ranks of the bureaucracy, and even political parties that are brought in.

Parties can form a government because they are “allowed” to, and they can operate only within the space the elite define for them. If they step outside the boundaries, the elite have several enforcement tools, ranging from party dissolution to criminal lawsuits, disqualification, or even forming a new party to challenge them.

“The conservative apparatus in 2019 was Palang Pracharath. In 2023, it was still Palang Pracharath and United Thai Nation Party, though the two operated separately. After the 2023 election, Pheu Thai’s decision to cross the aisle to join hands in forming a government was like a gateway that allowed it to administer the country temporarily. However, if it does anything that goes against the interests [of the elite] or crosses the drawn boundaries, it will be dealt with accordingly,” said Siripan.

Although Pheu Thai joined conservative parties to form the government in 2023, the establishment never considered it truly part of the conservative bloc. If it were, former PM Srettha Thavisin would still be in office, and Pheu Thai’s patriarch Thaksin Shinawatra would not have been imprisoned.

“In the 2026 election, the party that the establishment appears to prefer and believes can be within the frame is Bhumjaithai. Personally, I see Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai as different. Pheu Thai was drawn in as a temporary substitute. Bhumjaithai, by contrast, is believed to be a partner of the conservative establishment,” noted Siripan.

Siripan asserted that this does not mean that Pheu Thai and the People’s Party have no chance to form a government if they win the upcoming election. It is not impossible, but their government is likely to be temporary.

“If you [Pheu Thai or the People’s Party] gain enough votes in the election, they [the elite] will not want to block you outright. They will let you run, but only within the lane that has already been marked out. If you step outside that lane, there are ways to deal with you, as we have seen in the cases of former PM Srettha, Paetongtarn, or the Future Forward Party and the Move Forward Party,” said the political science professor.

The elite also attempts to weaken parties that truly represent the people so that people would believe that they no longer support public hopes for change. To achieve this, the Thai opposition is often pitted against one another. According to Siripan, the strategy has been effective, as opposition parties now have no unity and focus on fighting each other, rather than cooperating in critical moments.

“In fact, the path to transforming Thai society lies directly with the strength of the opposition being unified. If we look at the history of transitions to democracy, this is the first important condition. Then there must be political leaders with a strong and genuine commitment to change. But we have stronger egos and so they are unwilling to cooperate,” said Siripan.

Typically, political parties with the same ideology tend to cooperate, but in the case of Pheu Thai and the People’s Party, both have deep-rooted conflicts. Both parties compete for the same group of voters. It was evident in the constituencies where MPs from the three main parties ran against one another, and that this often allowed the conservative rival to secure a victory. Siripan asserted that this internal rivalry within the same political camp serves as the primary cause of friction.

Siripan also argued that social media platforms are not suitable for political debate since this leads to misunderstanding. However, social media has become the main arena for supporters and intellectual leaders from both parties, and when it comes to debate, it can be easily fuelled. This has undeniably caused deep conflicts between supporters from both parties, perpetuating distrust.

“Looking at Thai politics from now on, the greatest concern is that there is no space of trust for cooperation the Red [Pheu Thai]) and the Orange [People’s Party]. The space has shrunk. So, no matter which party wins or which party will form the government, the political system from now on will be built upon a shaky foundation,” noted Siripan.

The 2017 Constitution and the need for gradual amendment

The containment system maintained by the elite would not exist without a powerful tool, and that tool is the 2017 Constitution. Progressive parties and civil society organisations have long campaigned for its amendment. Notably, the 2026 election will coincide with the first referendum on constitutional amendment amid uncertainty and potential obstacles.

“The 2017 Constitution is the most important tool and the important key to maintaining order and the power structure established by the elite. So they do not want it amended because having the 2017 Constitution means they can manage a government they do not favour, even though they allowed it, without needing a coup,” noted Siripan.

Siripan remarked that the 2017 Constitution featured “rule by referee,” in which independent government agencies have been weaponised by the elite to resist reform. Even if the Constitution eventually must be amended, what the final version will look like remains uncertain.

“If you ask whether we need to amend it, we do. But the amendment process must be sufficiently mature, which means the general public agrees that the constitution should be amended . That is why I have consistently argued that if a full amendment is not yet possible, we should begin with article-by-article amendments,” added the professor.

She noted that constitutional amendment is a daunting task and requires gradual change, as some issues cannot be addressed within a certain time frame, while she proposed that provisions regarding PM candidates can be amended immediately. 

The 2017 Constitution states that each party can nominate up to three PM candidates, and the candidates do not need to be MPs. Compared to other countries with parliamentary systems, the MP with the most support will undeniably be the PM, and there will be no deadlock.

“Allowing three PM candidates [for each party] creates a political roadblock. Importantly, it also diminishes the PM’s political accountability, as the PM is not a member of the House of Representatives,” said Siripan.

“Some political parties adhere to the argument that the constitution is the fruit of a poisonous tree and that there is no way that it can ever be a good constitution. But it has to be said that this goes against the facts. Indonesia, for example, still uses a constitution drafted in 1945 by former President Sukarno, who was a total dictator. They still use it, but have amended it article by article on four occasions. Today, the Indonesian Constitution has only 11% of its original content,” she added.

The 2026 general elections are like playing a political game with a pre-written script, offering no significant change. Yet Siripan emphasised that there is a dynamic of change. On one side, it may be directed, but the other side is still governed by the nature of society itself.

“I’d like people to look at what kind of post-election political system we most want to live in— whether like before, with rapid change, or with gradual change. The greatest danger is that the conservative elite wants to see that the election does not bring change and does not bring hope. If we think that we’re directly fighting this power, we cannot afford to lose hope in elections. Even if the election may not immediately meet our expectations, elections are still the only tool which could actually bring about our vision of the political system we desire,” remarked the political science professor.