Thai politics is coming to another turning point. On 1 July, the Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra after it accepted a petition filed by Senate President Mongkol Surasajja seeking Paetongtarn’s removal for a breach of ethics over the leaked call between Paetongtarn and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen.

Although the Prime Minister was only suspended while the petition is considered, the Court’s order was a blow to the government and the Pheu Thai Party. And this is not the first time something like this has happened. Over the past two decades, the Constitutional Court has ruled on cases that led to several political turning points for the government, political parties, even for the democratic form of government itself.

Let’s take a look back at the Constitutional Court’s role as the ultimate arbiter in Thai politics.

2006 – 2007: The beginning of judicial activism

The 2005 landslide win for the Thai Rak Thai Party led by Thaksin Shinawatra was a turning point which led to the use of judicial power by conservative forces against majority rule in the democratic regime.

The Constitutional Court’s role expanded during the conflict between the Thaksin administration and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which accused the government of being a ‘parliamentary dictatorship’ and using its power for personal gain, as well as ignoring the rule of law and violating human rights.

On 24 February 2006, Thaksin dissolved parliament, but the opposition, led by the Democrat Party, boycotted the 2 April 2006 election because they believed the government was trying to avoid investigation. The boycott disrupted the election in several constituencies, where there was only one candidate running unopposed and voter turnout did not reach the required minimum. There were also accusations that Thai Rak Thai paid smaller parties to run candidates to give the appearance of an opposition.

The Constitutional Court declared the 2 April 2006 election invalid ostensibly on the grounds that the polls were scheduled only 37 days after dissolution of the House, making a fair election impossible. The Court also said that the arrangement of voting booths prevented a secret ballot as required by the Constitution. The ruling came after a speech made by the late King Bhumibol to Administrative and Supreme Court judges inviting them to solve the political impasse.

The Court mandated a new election but before this could be held, a military junta, the Council for Democratic Reform, later renamed the Council for National Security (CNS), staged a military coup on 19 September 2006.

After the coup, the CNS passed an interim constitution which replaced the Constitutional Court with a Constitutional Tribunal, hand-picked by the military, which ruled to dissolve the Thai Rak Thai Party for paying people to run in the election and to disqualify its 111 executive board members from taking any political role for 5 years. However, it was later reported that a false witness was hired. Since the offence occurred before the law was passed, the ruling was also criticized for retroactive application.

The Constitutional Court invalidation of the election, followed by the coup and the dissolution of the Thai Rak Thai Party, changed Thailand’s political landscape. This also led to a new wave of conflict, splitting society into the ‘Yellow Shirts’, an anti-Thai Rak Thai government movement led by the PAD, and the ‘Red Shirts,’ led by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, which opposed the coup and supported the Thaksin government.

2008 – 2010: Removal of 2 prime ministers, changing coalitions

After the 2006 military coup, the CNS drafted and passed the 2007 Constitution and organized a general election. The People’s Power Party, based on the remnants of Thai Rak Thai, won the most seats as people continued to be drawn to the populist policies from the Thaksin era such as debt suspension for farmers, village development funds, the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) project, and the 30-baht healthcare scheme. As a result, Samak Sundaravej became Prime Minister.

However, less than a year after taking office, the Constitutional Court dismissed Samak on the grounds that he had been paid for hosting a cooking show and therefore qualified as an employee, which disqualified him from being a Minister or Prime Minister under the 2007 Constitution. The ruling was criticized for broadening the interpretation of the law for political purposes, in order to remove Samak who was seen as a nominee of Thai Rak Thai/Thaksin.

To replace Samak, the government coalition nominated Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, but he managed to stay in office for only 75 days while PAD protesters occupied Government House and blocked airports. The Constitutional Court later dissolved the People’s Power Party after finding one of its deputy leaders guilty of vote-buying. Somchai and all party executives were banned from politics.

The Constitutional Court ruling created a turning point that changed the governing coalition. Abhisit Vejjajiva, leader of the main opposition Democrat Party, was named Prime Minister with support from a group known as “Friends of Newin,” former members of the People’s Power Party who would go on to form the Bhumjaithai Party. Meanwhile, rumours were circulated that the Army engineered the formation of the new coalition.

The dissolution of a major party and disqualification of elected politicians led to strong opposition against the Abhisit government. The Red Shirt protests began in 2009 to demand dissolution of the House and a new election. Their demands were met with the violent crackdown of 2010, which killed at least 94 people – an event which became a large wound in Thailand’s history of political conflict.

2012 – 2014: Judicial activism takes over the law, overthrows an election, paves the way for a coup

Abhisit dissolved the House and a new election was held in 2011. The Pheu Thai Party, led by Thaksin’s sister Yingluck Shinawatra and containing the remnants of the PPP minus the Bhumjaithai faction, won the election. Her government, however, faced judicial activism at the hands of the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court twice blocked attempts to amend the Constitution. The first time was when the government attempted to amend the Constitution so that it could form an elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly, which would lead to a new Constitution. The Court ruled that a referendum must first be conducted before the Constitution can be amended in this manner.

The second time was when the Constitutional Court blocked an attempt to amend the Constitution to create an entirely elected Senate, ruling that this was treason because the government was trying to obtain the power to rule the country through unconstitutional means.

The Constitutional Court also blocked a bill allowing the Ministry of Finance to take out a 2-trillion-baht loan to develop transportation infrastructure. It ruled that the bill was unconstitutional on the grounds that it allowed the government to spend money outside of the national budget, the issue was not urgent, and not in line with fiscal discipline. The ruling was heavily criticized, especially after some judges showed bias through personal opinions regarding the urgency of the issue, such as “Wait until there are no more dirt roads in Thailand.”

The passing of a “blanket amnesty” bill sparked protests by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), a coalition of yellow shirt groups. Yingluck decided to dissolve the House and scheduled an election on 2 February 2014. The Democrat Party once again boycotted the election, while the PDRC, which included a number of prominent former Democrat Party members, disrupted the registration process and blocked polling stations, so that in some constituencies polling could not take place.

The Ombudsman submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court to rule whether the election was constitutional. The Court ruled that the part of the Royal Decree calling for an election was unconstitutional because the election could not be completed on the same day throughout the country. The Court did not consider the reasons why voting was made impossible.

The ruling created a political vacuum. Since the Court did not rule that the entire Royal Decree was invalid, it was unclear whether the government could issue a new decree, while the Election Commission could not hold new elections in disrupted constituencies.

After the Supreme Administrative Court ordered Yingluck to reverse her transfer of the Secretary General of the National Security Council, a military-appointed Senator petitioned the Court to remove Yingluck from office. The Court ruled that the transfer involved nepotism and removed Yingluck from her position as caretaker PM, together with 9 cabinet ministers who had supported the transfer. The ruling came only one day after Yingluck had given her arguments to the court and while the Court was under tight security. In a similar case involving Abhisit 3 months earlier, the Court had given the opposite ruling.

These rulings, along with prolonged and sometimes volent protests by the PDRC, led to the military coup of 22 May 2014 by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO).

The coup triggered widespread protests, leading to violations of people’s rights and freedoms. At least 929 people were summoned by the NCPO and held in military camps. At least 245 people were charged for joining protests, while 169 were charged with sedition, all for protesting the coup.

2014 – 2019: The NCPO-era Constitutional Court and the protection of power transfer

The Constitutional Court continued to function after the 2014 coup. The NCPO had interfered with the process of appointing judges by using Section 44 of the Interim Constitution that they had written to extend judges’ terms, and by using the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), whose members were appointed by the NCPO, to approve Constitutional Court judges.

The Constitutional Court was criticized at this time for protecting the junta government and supporting the transfer of its power. It ruled that the controversial 2016 Referendum Act did not contradict the Constitution. The Act was criticized for its broad limitations on freedom of expression, making the referendum on the new Constitution neither free nor fair, but the Court did not find it unconstitutional for people who campaigned against the Constitution drafted by the NCPO to be prosecuted.

The Court also dismissed a petition requesting a ruling on whether the Head of the NCPO Order 3/2558 prohibiting political gatherings of more than 5 people violated the right to freedom of assembly. The petition was dismissed on the technical argument that the petitioners could not directly petition the Court but had go through the Ombudsman or other courts.

It also ruled that Section 185 of the Organic Act on Anti-Corruption, which allowed the NLA-appointed President and national anti-corruption commissioners to stay in office until the end of their terms, did not contradict the Constitution. Members of other independent organizations not approved by the NLA and the NCPO were not allowed this privilege.

2019 – 2023: Dissolution of opposition parties and continuation of the Prayut government

The Constitutional Court was behind several changes to the Thai political landscape after the 2017 Constitution came into effect.

In 2019, it dissolved the Thai Raksa Chart Party for nominating former Princess Ubolratana Mahidol as a candidate for Prime Minister. The party was seen as a spin-off from Pheu Thai in a strategic move to circumvent the Mixed Members Apportionment (MMA) voting system, which was designed to reduce the number of party-list seats that larger parties could obtain in favour of mid-sized parties.

The Court ruled that the nomination of the former princess was not in conformity with the constitutional monarchy, although questions were raised whether the ECT should have been able to forestall the nomination. The dissolution meant that Thai Raksa Chart could no longer run in the 2019 election after Pheu Thai had decided not have candidates in every constituency. This had the effect of reducing the Pheu Thai seats.

In 2020, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Future Forward Party for taking a 191-million-baht loan from its leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, ruling that it was an unlawful donation. The ruling was criticized on the grounds that a loan was not the same as a donation, and that the elements of the offense was not complete. The Court’s interpretation of the law reduced the number of opposition MPs and strengthened the government of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, whose multi-party coalition had a thin majority in parliament.

Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court was seen as shielding Gen Prayut, leader of the NCPO who was named Prime Minister after the 2019 election. In 2020, it ruled that Gen Prayut had not broken the law by staying in army housing rent-free after retirement from active service because it was in line with army regulations and it would be beneficial for security.

In 2022, it ruled that Gen Prayut could stay as Prime Minister because his term in office was to be counted from when the 2017 Constitution came into effect, although he became Prime Minister in August 2014. He therefore had not exceeded the 8-year term limit for a Prime Minister.

After the 2019 general election, several parties proposed that the Constitution should be amended by a Constitutional Drafting Assembly. The proposal was made by the Democrat Party, which was in the government coalition at the time, and the opposition Pheu Thai and Future Forward parties. However, the process was disrupted after NCPO-appointed senators filed a petition with the Constitutional Court, claiming that parliament did not have the authority to write a new Constitution.

It is clear that the Constitutional Court had expanded its role from dealing with politicians and political parties to taking control of the politics of both the executive branch and the legislative branch. In March 2021, the Court issued Ruling 4/2564, stating that it is within parliament’s power to write a new Constitution, but a referendum must be held first to determine whether the people want a new Constitution. Another referendum must then be held after a draft has been completed. However, since the ruling was unclear about how many referendums were needed, it was used by the Senate as an excuse to dismiss a bill proposing constitutional amendments in 2021. Interpretation of the 4/2564 ruling continues to be contentious.

2023 – 2025: Suspending and dismissing Prime Ministers, dissolving the Move Forward Party

In the 14 May 2023 general election, the Move Forward Party won the highest number of seats. Its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, became the target of lawfare. A complaint was filed against him for holding shares in the defunct media company ITV. He was suspended, but later cleared of the accusation. And although the evidence was unclear and questions have been raised of the political nature of the complaint, it rattled the Party and made Pita appear a less legitimate candidate for Prime Minister. This led to a change of coalition parties, under the strong influence of the NCPO-appointed Senate.

The Move Forward Party was then accused of treason for campaigning to change the royal defamation law and moving an amendment in parliament. The Constitutional Court ruled that the campaign was indeed treasonous, although the amendment of laws is a basic constitutional function of the legislative branch. Judicial power had now encroached onto the territory of parliament, affecting future policy-making.

Soon after, the Constitutional Court ruled to dismiss then-Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for breaching ethical standards by appointing to his Cabinet someone who had been sentenced to prison. Questions have been raised whether this should have been an issue for the qualifications of the person appointed. And just this week, the Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra after she was also accused of a serious ethics breach.

These incidents show that the law and the judicial system are being used to get rid of political opponents rather than protect democracy. The law used in these cases often depends on interpretations by those in power, lacks clarity, and is part of a mechanism to interfere with the democratic process, within both the executive and legislative branches.