On 26 March 2025, the House of Representatives voted 319 to 162 to express confidence in Paetongtarn Shinawatra to continue serving as Prime Minister. According to Section 151 of the Constitution, a no-confidence motion requires more than half of the total number of MPs—at least 247 votes—to pass. The debate lasted 32 hours and 32 minutes, spanning more than two days.

The censure debate offers a glimpse into Thailand’s political landscape, highlighting both its challenges and dynamics. Here are Prachatai’s key takeaways:

Government coalition can still keep going

Without any defectors in the government coalition, the Prime Minister stated that there would be no cabinet reshuffle. Meanwhile, the 7 opposition MPs who voted "confidence" for the Prime Minister included 1 from the Palang Pracharat Party and 5 from the Thai Sang Thai Party, which have effectively aligned themselves with the government for some time. Chaiyamphawan 'Puaut' Manpianjit from the Thai Progress Party, who is facing charges for molesting a foreign tourist, also voted in favour of the government. Another attempt to buy a People’s Party MP has also been exposed.

Over the past six months, there have been many frictions between Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai regarding easing the procedure for constitutional amendments and pushing forward the political amnesty, which Bhumjaithai exploited technicalities to oppose. Additionally, there have been potential exchanges of blackmail concerning a piece of land at Khao Kradong involving Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul and the Alpine Golf Club case involving the Shinawatra family of Pheu Thai. Accusations of corruption in the Senate selection process could be part of coalition politics.

While these hotspots could escalate, the result of the censure debate shows that it is unlikely they will play out in a cabinet reshuffle. Pheu Thai will face challenges in implementing policies unless it can rely heavily on its coalition partners, and it must be innovative in order to secure their cooperation from the coalition parties, such as by seeking assistance from China to combat the scam industry along the border while Bhumjaithai holds key positions, especially the Minister of Interior.

Beyond the challenges within the coalition, the government also struggles with the bureaucracy. In a discussion on energy prices, where the government is accused of inflating GDP projections to distort figures for future energy demand, the Energy Minister’s remarks also hinted at the possibility of bureaucratic inertia, which could have an impact on the Pheu Thai’s performance. The government’s tensions with the Bank of Thailand further illustrate this challenge. Ultimately, Pheu Thai’s ability to deliver on its promises and policies will be crucial if it hopes to secure votes in the next election.

Meanwhile, there was no "silver bullet" from Gen Prawit Wongsuwan of the Phalang Pracharat Party—who recently claimed that a fortune teller predicted he could become prime minister, despite his party's spin doctors hinting before the debate that one would be fired in parliament, with independent bodies coordinating to maximize the debate’s impact.

Gen Prawit is said to still wield significant influence over Thailand’s independent oversight bodies, particularly the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). Having overseen the appointment of key officials since rising to power after the 2014 military coup, he is said to still be an influential figure in their operations.

Recently, the NACC announced new criteria requiring civil servants, politicians, and state employees in de facto marital relationships without official marriage registration to declare their assets for scrutiny. 

Gen Prawit's anti-climactic speech lasted only 20 minutes, primarily addressing his opposition to the entertainment complex proposal and the MOU44 with Cambodia. The tension between coalition parties remains, leaving room for Gen Prawit to reenter government if he plays his cards right. However, his path to the prime minister's office remains unlikely—unless a significant shift in the political landscape occurs.

The People’s Party path narrows

The People’s Party is now facing significant institutional constraints. Not only must it tread carefully to avoid the disqualification of its 44 MPs, but it also risks tarnishing its reputation if it triggers the involvement of illegitimate independent bodies to penalize other political parties during this censure debate. Furthermore, excessive pressure could push Pheu Thai closer to the establishment to the detriment of the People’s Party.

Censure debates rarely lead to a change of government in Thailand. Instead, opposition parties often leverage these debates to effectively communicate their positions to the public, aiming to gain support and win votes in the next election. The People’s Party remains at the forefront of public discourse. Outside of parliament, issues such as Chinese control over durian farms and corruption within the Social Security system are gaining significant attention.

Inside parliament, however, the party faces growing procedural constraints. For the People’s Party, the appointment of Wan Muhammad Noor Matha as House Speaker has proven to be a big mistake. In this censure debate, opposition MPs have seen their speaking time curtailed. While crucial issues like constitutional amendments and political amnesty remain on the agenda, topics such as the military’s Information Operations have been abruptly halted by the speaker. As a result, the People’s Party is increasingly resorting to the public sphere. Institutionally, this could erode the public’s confidence in parliament’s role as a mechanism for conflict resolution.

Deep state exposed

Bangkok MP Chanyaphon Satondee's presentation included a table of High-Valie Targets in the military's information operation, including activists, academics, NGOs, and media outlets. 

The climax of this censure debate, however, was the exposé of the military's information operations, which the opposition attributes to the Prime Minister’s dereliction of duty for allowing it to happen. The People’s Party has continued what has now become its tradition of exposing such operations in parliament. This time, Chayaphon Satondee, a Bangkok MP representing Constituency 8 (Chatuchak-Laksi), took on the role previously taken by Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn and Nattacha Boonchaiinsawat to speak on the issue.

The military’s information operations have become more sophisticated, as evidenced by an order to implement Information-Related Capabilities and develop more offensive operations against High-Value Targets, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, academics, and political figures. So far, the Direct Counter Measure has involved 84,641 attacks against 85 targets. Even Thaksin and Prachatai are on ISOC’s watchlist. These terminologies, Chayaphon said, are typically reserved for foreign adversaries.

Its operational structure became more unified shortly before the 2023 election. All branches of the military now converge at the Joint Operations Center. At the personnel level, this includes the Royal Guard Corps, the Special Operations Royal Guard Corps 904, the Army, and the Royal Thai Police. At the command level, this includes the Army Chief of Staff, the Deputy Commander of the First Army Area, the Commander of the 1st Royal Guard Division, the Commander of Military Intelligence, the Director of the Army Cyber Center, and the Commander of the Cybercrime Investigation Division from the Royal Thai Police.

This organizational change demonstrates how Information Operations and the security apparatus, in general, have increasingly come under the oversight of the Royal Office. The debate was abruptly halted by the Deputy Speaker at the moment the name of the chief of the operation, Gen Thammanoon Withee, was mentioned. Chayaphon identified him as having played a key role in prosecuting anti-coup activists during the early days of the NCPO era and in the pro-democracy protests under the government of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. In October 2023, the Royal Gazette revealed his appointment to military positions as a servant of His Majesty.

China is watching

Chinese diplomats were reportedly observing the second day of the censure debate. (Photo: TPchannel)

In the censure debate, it was reported that Chinese diplomats attended the session as observers at the invitation of parliament. According to protocol, parliament extends invitations to diplomats from all countries. However, there have been no reports of attendance from other foreign diplomats thus far.

Opposition MPs have raised several issues concerning China, including the deportation of Uyghurs, infrastructure projects, zero-dollar industries, the influx of Chinese workers, Thailand’s 1.6 trillion baht trade deficit with China, and scam operations. It is not surprising that Chinese diplomats were in attendance, given the growing controversies surrounding Chinese capital in Thailand.

The censure debate also unfolded amid shifts in U.S. geopolitical strategy, including aid cuts and new tariffs. Meanwhile, Thailand was recently downgraded to Not Free by Freedom House, and the European Union condemned the deportation of Uyghurs and the enforcement of the royal defamation law—both factors that could affect ongoing free trade agreement negotiations. These developments may push Thailand further into China’s sphere of influence.

With all these factors in play, the censure debate underscores the growing influence of China in Thailand, which is likely to persist, if not intensify, heading into the next election. Without a clear counterbalance, this influence could erode voter confidence in the government, opening the door for political parties that offer viable solutions to address the mounting concerns over Thailand’s relationship with China.

Thaksin in a predicament

In this censure debate, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra came under scrutiny from opposition parties, with the People’s Party specifically targeting her in its motion. Initially, the motion was directed at Thaksin Shinawatra, but under pressure from the House Speaker, the party softened its stance, agreeing to refer to him only as a family member.

Nonetheless, much of the debate remained focused on Thaksin, covering a wide range of issues—from political reform and energy prices to the southern border provinces. The core argument was that Thaksin’s return came at the expense of perpetuating corrupt and ineffective policies, and that he continues to rule from the shadows.

In fact, Thaksin’s position is peculiar but hardly enviable. Given the institutional arrangement, Thaksin’s consultancy appears more as a survival tactic than a move for political expediency. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, who comfortably held formal roles as senior minister and minister mentor while traveling freely, Thaksin remains shackled. As a pardoned convict, he is not only under ISOC’s watch and constrained by independent bodies but also banned from traveling abroad.

Similarly, unlike Lee Hsien Loong, who underwent rigorous training and has proven himself a capable leader, Paetongtarn is still learning to navigate her role as a national leader. Moreover, neither Thaksin nor Paetongtarn enjoys the same political security as Hun Sen and Hun Manet, who hold power without facing competition from other political parties.

Thaksin’s survival will depend on Pheu Thai’s success. If this censure debate means anything, it outlines Pheu Thai’s challenges ahead over the next several years. Not only is it stuck in coalition politics, it also faces looming challenges from the independent bodies, an uncooperative bureaucracy and the security apparatus. In the electoral arena, it also faces a challenge from the People’s Party and other coalition parties. Undoubtedly, Pheu Thai will face an uphill battle, keeping Thaksin awake at night.