Governance in the troubled Deep South has suffered from militarization, a lack of vision, and wasteful spending. But a push for transparency and power shifts in Bangkok have offered some hope.

The three southern border provinces of Thailand—Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat—and parts of Songkhla have been plagued by violence for the last 20 years. From the theft of weapons at the 4th Development Battalion at Pileng Camp in Cho-airong, Narathiwat on 4 January 2004 until 30 June 2024, there have been 22,624 violent incidents, resulting in 7,611 deaths and 14,208 injuries, according to Deep South Watch.

The situation has left both the government and local residents in distress, constantly in fear of the next incident. For 20 years, governments in Bangkok have struggled to establish peace, enacting numerous laws and repeatedly setting up and dismantling different agencies. However, these efforts have achieved little success due to political instability in the capital, exacerbated by two military coups.

As governments have come and gone, gaps and redundancies have multiplied. Over the past 20 years, 540 billion baht has been spent in the southern border provinces. While at times violence may decrease, these periods are brief, and the overall situation remains far from peaceful. Meanwhile, the quality of life of residents continues to deteriorate. Efforts appear disorganized.

How is the Deep South governed?

Currently, three main groups are responsible for the administration of the three southern border provinces. The first is the standard administrative structure, similar to other parts of Thailand. Each province has a governor and district chiefs appointed by the government in Bangkok, alongside separate local administrations elected by the public. In contemporary Thai politics, there have been calls from civil society for greater decentralization, such as eliminating appointed positions or making them elected.

There has also been discussion about designating the southern border provinces as a special administrative region, similar to Bangkok and Pattaya. However, concerns from conservative groups that such a move could be seen as a step toward separation from the Thai state have so far prevented the idea from coming to fruition. Those with a more moderate stance view these concerns as stemming from paranoia.

The second group is the military apparatus, primarily represented by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), a long-established security agency from the Cold War era whose ultimate mission is to defend the monarchy. After the fall of communism, ISOC's role diminished in the 1990s and 2000s as they tried to stay relevant by focusing on nontraditional security issues like drug-trafficking and illegal immigration.

During the premierships of Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra, the government attempted to decrease ISOC’s role and transition it to greater civilian control. However, following the 2006 military coup, ISOC was revitalized under the Internal Security Act of 2008. Although officially under the supervision of the Prime Minister, it is effectively driven by the military establishment, with the Army Commander-in-Chief serving as Deputy Director and the Army Chief of Staff as Secretary-General.

The role of ISOC has significantly expanded during periods of military dictatorship, particularly under Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha in the wake of the military coup in 2014. With minimal political disruption, ISOC has established a strong presence in the southern border provinces. Their practices have been highly questionable, not only in the southern border provinces but also nationwide. ISOC has gained notoriety for its heavy-handed measures against dissidents, with international organizations and civil society raising concerns over arbitrary arrests, prosecutions, surveillance, and possible cases of enforced disappearance.

Concerns about a lack of transparency have also emerged, following revelations of the possible use of fake personnel in the area to request additional budgets. Moreover, a substantial portion of ISOC’s resources has been directed towards branding the military as ‘developers,’ leading to mission overlap with the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC). As violence persists, there have been calls from the opposition to abolish or reform the ISOC, but under the government led by Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, these demands have so far been dismissed.

The third group consists of civilian agencies, with the SBPAC being one of the primary entities. Established in 1981 during the Cold War under Prime Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, the SBPAC was created to manage conflicts and violence in the region. In the same year, the 43rd Civil-Police-Military Command (CPM 43) was set up as a security agency under the command of the Fourth Army Region Commander to coordinate with the SBPAC.

In 2002, during a relatively peaceful period when most incidents involved only common crimes, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra dissolved SBPAC and CPM 43, shifting their responsibilities to the National Security Council. After the theft of weapons from Pileng Camp in 2004, critics accused Thaksin's government of dismantling the previously effective structures. In response, he created the Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command (SBPPC) in March 2004 under his direct supervision. Despite this, violence escalated.

After Thaksin was ousted in the 2006 coup, Prime Minister Gen Surayud Chulanont's government revived the SBPAC and CPM 43 in October 2006, initially placing them under ISOC. Under the premiership of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the Southern Border Provinces Administration Act of 2010 restructured the SBPAC, making it a separate legal entity while still reporting directly to the Prime Minister.

The model under the 2010 Act had three main strengths as an example of a civilian approach to resolving the conflict. Firstly, the SBPAC is civilian in nature, which made the organization more amenable to negotiations among conflicting parties. Secondly, the SBPAC focused more on development rather than security. Thirdly, it established the Advisory Council for the Southern Border Administration and Development, bringing a wider range of stakeholders into the policymaking process.

After Yingluck Shinawatra’s government was overthrown in the 2014 military coup, all these strengths of the SBPAC were nullified. Exercising power under Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution, Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha issued National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) Order No. 14/2016 to suspend the SBPAC’s Advisory Council, where stakeholders chose each other as their representatives, and establish an Advisory Committee in its place, allowing almost all of its members to be top-down appointments.

Moreover, Gen. Prayut ordered the SBPAC to collaborate with and follow the advice of ISOC, granting ultimate authority to ISOC in cases of overlap or duplication. Following its integration with the ISOC, the SBPAC appeared to lose its autonomy as a civilian-based agency. Fortunately, recent developments in Bangkok have begun to improve the situation for the SBPAC.

Another key civilian agency is the National Security Council (NSC), which plays a vital role in administration and security in the southern border provinces. Chaired by the Prime Minister, the NSC formulates policies and guidelines related to regional security. Chatchai Bangchuad, the NSC’s Deputy Secretary-General, was recently appointed to lead Thailand's negotiations with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), hosted by Malaysia. The outcome of these talks offers prospects for de-escalation in the region.

Critical weaknesses

Romadon Panjor, a party-list MP in the opposition (file photo)

From the experts’ point of view, the governance of southern border provinces suffers from two critical weaknesses: lack of vision and budget misallocation.

Romadon Panjor, a native of the southern border provinces, has been working for peace in the Deep South in various roles since the 2010s. Now, as a party-list MP in the opposition, he is using parliamentary mechanisms, including the House of Representatives' Committee on State Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy and National Reform, to push for peace in the southern border provinces.

"Transitioning from a journalist to a different type of player, to be an analyst, to be a coordinator engaging with people from various sectors, my asset in managing complex data, interacting with people who have diverse viewpoints, both within my own [opposition] party and with supporters, have made seemingly impossible tasks possible," he said.

“Coming from a conflict area where over 7,000 people have died, if we remain stuck with that, we can't really envision a political solution. Being in the legislature, I’ve learned to negotiate with other parties and government agencies, and to understand the expectations of the people,” said Romadon about his experience as a new MP.

Observing the developments since the 2023 election, Romadon says “He [Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin] does not seem to pay sufficient attention to the problems in the south. It may be that the government will continue to leave things to the military or ISOC, as I see no clear direction being set on solving the problems or achieving peace by some new approach.”

Dulayarut Buyuso, Chair of the Area-Based Peace Dialogue Steering Committee (file photo)

Lack of clear direction leads to ineffective spending. Dunyarat Booyoosoh, Chair of the Area-Based Peace Dialogue Working Group, highlighted two common misconceptions. The first is that the SBPAC and local administrative organizations have overlapping responsibilities, leading to duplication. The second is that the SBPAC, which focuses on development, and ISOC, which focuses on security, operate with a clear separation of duties.

In reality, the situation is quite the opposite. Although there is significant overlap in operations between the SBPAC and local administrative organizations, they can still coordinate with and support each other. The real issue lies in the duplication of tasks and budget allocations of ISOC and the SBPAC, which remains largely unresolved.

"We must admit that most of the budget currently is with the SBPAC, but sometimes, each year, the funds are not fully utilized. No one yet knows where to allocate all of it," said Dunyarat. He further elaborated that while the SBPAC has its core responsibilities, it has fewer new projects because it lacks input from the Advisory Council, a consultative body suspended by military rule. Under the Pheu Thai government, this problem has recently been addressed.

Budget transparency

Even though the situation looks grim, there are two short-term prospects for the southern border provinces: a push for budget transparency and a recent power shift in Bangkok, which pave the way for possible, albeit modest, changes. Since policies are reflected in the budget, making the budget transparent can encourage public scrutiny and participation in the policy-making process, offering a glimmer of hope.

Having observed the budget approval process for the southern border provinces over a long period, Dunyarat found that government agencies in these provinces seem to have more spending freedom than elsewhere. “It’s special in many ways, especially in procurement, which does not require online bidding,” he explained.

“Any kind of contracts can be made, which is more convenient. The mechanisms of the State Audit Office and the National Anti-Corruption Commission remain as before. Large budgets come down from the major ministries, whereas the local budgets remain insufficient as before. There is a mandate, but the budget doesn’t cover 30%. There must be more decentralization.

"When you look at the real facts, it's even more shocking,” said Romadon. “Over the past 20 years, 540 billion baht has been spent in the southern border provinces. We used a lot of capital and a lot of public resources to solve the problem, but the quality of life remains quite low, and unemployment rates are high, not forgetting that the conflict situation still persists.”

Romadon said that there was an attempt by the NCPO government to deploy an integrated planning policy by using the same set of common indicators so that each agency can work together under a unified strategy. However, Romadon discovered that there was a long list of budget items which remain outside the integrated budget, particularly those related to security.

“Excluding them prevents us from seeing the true costs that Thai society wastes in solving the problem,” said Romadon. “The especially problematic budgets are for personnel and operations, amounting to 3-4 billion baht annually. These are allowances for working officers. There are suspicions that the number of positions that are set up to request a budget might not match the actual personnel on the ground. Many have criticized this as the source of ghost payrolls at ISOC.”

The term 'ghost payroll' refers to a case from two years ago where a female police corporal stationed in Ratchaburi was listed as seconded to ISOC Region 4 Forward Command, a scandal that has yet to be fully investigated. Beyond these potential corruption cases, there were also unnecessary projects. Despite efforts to reduce duplication, the military was still entrusted with projects that they were not supposed to do.

“There were some tasks where the more they did, the worse it was, especially political missions,” said Romadon. “The more they work with community networks, the more distrust they create. There are plenty of projects like this, and it is the duty of the legislature like us to scrutinize this budget spending.

It is important that this kind of information is not only for Romadon to find out about, but also the general public. The Budget Bureau has made budget documents available for download as PDF files. Accessing them may require basic knowledge of budget structures to locate specific expenditures, but this is an opportunity to encourage public participation in an otherwise opaque process.

“This is something we can learn,” said Romadon. “In fact, this kind of knowledge is accessible to citizens, but the state may need to facilitate easier access. If these documents were simplified, the public could participate in monitoring the information. We wouldn’t need to wait for someone to discuss it in parliament; we could access, analyze, and share it ourselves.”

Budget Expenditures for the Southern Border Provinces and Related Agencies (2019-2023)

(Unit: Million Baht)

Source: Budget Bureau

Note: The ISOC and NSC budgets in parentheses are portions used for southern situation management, included in the integrated budget for solving southern border problems.

Power shift in Bangkok

Despite the Move Forward Party’s victory in the 2023 election, it was unable to form a government due to opposition from unelected senators. Moreover, it was recently dissolved by the Constitutional Court for campaigning to amend Section 112, also known as the lèse majesté law. The Pheu Thai Party opted to make a pact with the status quo as the leader of the government coalition. While the power shift in Bangkok does not look ideal, it still offers some hope for peace in the Deep South.

Change may be limited under Pheu Thai rule due to its reluctance to risk a misunderstanding with the establishment. However, we can expect a return of some of ideas that proved effective in the past but were rejected under military rule. Dunyarat called it a “transitional period.” These include the return of the SBPAC to its original status.

In November 2023, Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin appointed Pol Lt Gen Wannapong Kotcharak, who had served in various high-ranking positions within the Ministry of Justice, as the new Secretary-General of the SBPAC, replacing Rear Adm Somkiat Pholprayoon. Pol Lt Gen Wannapong became the second police officer to hold this position, following Pol Col Thawee Sodsong, an important figure who is widely accepted by the locals in the area.

Additionally, parliament voted unanimously to revoke NCPO Order No. 14/2016 and reinstate the Advisory Council to the SBPAC to encourage more participation from stakeholders and restore its autonomy from ISOC’s oversight. It will take time for the SBPAC to find its footing, but with renewed autonomy and a more inclusive approach, it has the potential to become a key driver of peace and development in the Deep South.

The new civilian government can also seize the opportunity to push forward the peace agreement. Or as Romadon put it, “We must seek a peace agreement that is mutually agreed upon by the people in the area as a guarantee that we can achieve sustainable peace. It originates from the condition that, after 20 years, neither side can decisively overpower the other through force alone. It must go through a process of negotiation and dialogue; we need to sit down and talk.”

As the efforts continue to reduce the role of the security forces, the peace negotiations seem to have made some progress. This year, the Thai government and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) have set a Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP), focusing on the reduction of violence, public consultation, and a political solution to the conflict. As the plan is fleshed out, Romadon expects the government to play a more proactive role in preventing escalation.

“When the Prime Minister visited the three provinces in February, he did not talk about security or peace but talked about tourism and the economy,” said Romadon “We expect that the government leader will have an approach to resolving the conflict where people in conflict use force.

“It requires the political power of the executive branch to determine the government's direction. There was an order to continue the peace talks, which the government has been cautious about addressing. The extension of the Emergency Decree in the area is no different from previous administrations. While there are changes in the internal structure but we expect the Prime Minister to work in a more concrete way.”

Srettha Thavisin was recently ousted by the Constitutional Court for violating ethical standards by appointing a person with a prior criminal conviction to his cabinet. However, with Paetongtarn Shinawatra as the new Prime Minister and power still remaining with the Pheu Thai Party, the government is likely to continue using the same approach, although realignments in the government coalition may cause some friction.

As the peace dialogue and the internal restructuring continues, ISOC must adjust its role to de-escalate the conflict. For Dunyarat, this is not impossible. From his observation, “ISOC, as a military unit, has an extensive media and public relations presence in the area, resulting in ISOC having a more favourable public image than even the SBPAC.” Despite its hawkishness, the ISOC has made efforts to correct its mistakes.

"They acknowledged that at the starting point of the conflict 20 years ago, the state itself shared responsibility in the use of violence. For instance, people who faced over 20 charges had to participate in a program under Section 21 of the Internal Security Act, which allows the court to order individuals to undergo training under ISOC's supervision for up to six months. However, some people disappeared because they were charged with 10 offenses, even though the main case involved only one. The rest were broadly interpreted just in case. Cases like this often occurred, so ISOC has some responsibility to work more carefully and with better targets.”

After all, the people of the southern border provinces are not inherently violent. In Dunyarat’s estimation, 90% of southern residents do not support separatism despite differing beliefs and ongoing tensions. They are not harbouring any grand ambitions. They simply want a better quality of life, an improved economy, and better education for their children.

In addition to immediate measures, Romadon proposes that the civilian government should also consider long-term strategies for conflict prevention beyond the southern border provinces, such as decentralization and a new governance model within the nationwide context, so that people of different cultures and ethnicities may coexist peacefully.

"I think the nearest political path is to sit down and discuss restructuring relationships in the administration of the area,” said Romadon. “How much power can we devolve to the local people while maintaining a binding connection to the state? This must align with the larger national direction, with calls for the election of provincial governors and the reform of community structures—issues that other parties seem to agree on in many respects.

“I have been interested in studying this issue since 2009 in collaboration with the Deep South Watch network. We've proposed over 10 models for decentralization or the political restructuring of the administration of the southern border provinces. Some models respond to the culture of the Muslim majority in the area, or cases where minorities in the area, like the Buddhists, must have a status and guarantees that their voices are important. How will they be represented in the legislative and the executive branches? They may not come from the election directly, but may come from a selection process or quotas. All of these matters are open for discussion.”